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A smart home is one equipped with connected Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices that can be 
remotely accessed and controlled. Access to smart home devices is mostly achieved 
through smartphones and tablet computers, but this comes with security challenges such as 
unauthorized access and interception of data transmission. Although smart home devices 
are critical, many examples of security challenges, such as unauthorized access to home 
devices and interception of data transmission, are reported. Furthermore, many home IoT 
devices are still shipped with default credentials even though it is widely known that these 
settings are used in attacks. A number of cryptographic schemes have been proposed for 
securing communication among home IoT devices. However, the ability to handle such 
schemes, especially by devices with constrained computing resources, can be challenging. 
To address the above issues, this thesis introduces a contextual authentication framework 
for smart home environments that integrates a context-based user authentication method, a 
device-to-device message authentication scheme, and an app-based user authentication 
model. A proof of concept prototype of context-based authentication has been constructed. 
An identity-based signcryption scheme for securing data transmission between home IoT 
devices has been designed, and an app-based user authentication model has been 
developed. The results demonstrate that considerable contextual information can be 
retrieved and such information can be used in providing seamless, usable, and secure 
authentication. Furthermore, analysis and evaluation of the proposed signcryption scheme 
demonstrate that, in addition to providing authentication, it provides integrity and 
confidentiality as well as the ability to protect communication against possible attacks. The 
evaluation of the app-based user authentication model is performed on three datasets, and 
the results show that the model has the ability to authenticate users with high accuracy in 
terms of low false positive, false negative and equal error rates. 
 
Keywords: Smart home security; context-based user authentication; app-based user 






I hereby declare that this thesis consists of original work of which I have authored. 
This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my 
examiners. 
I authorize the University of Ontario Institute of Technology (Ontario Tech 
University) to lend this thesis to other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly 
research. I further authorize University of Ontario Institute of Technology (Ontario Tech 
University) to reproduce this thesis by photocopying or by other means, in total or in part, 
at the request of other institutions or individuals for the purpose of scholarly research. I 
















STATEMENT OF CONTRIBUTIONS 
I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis, and I have used standard 
referencing practices to acknowledge ideas, research techniques, or other materials that 
belong to others. Furthermore, I hereby certify that I am the sole source of the creative 
works and/or inventive knowledge described in this thesis.  
Results from this thesis research have been disseminated in the following publications: 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “Classification and Feature Extraction for User 
Identification for Smart Home Networks Based on Apps Access History,” in 18th IEEE 
International Conference on Machine Learning and Applications (ICMLA), 2019, pp. 
376–380. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “User authentication for smart home networks based 
on mobile apps usage,” in 28th IEEE International Conference on Computer 
Communications and Networks, ICCCN, 2019, pp. 1–6. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “A Machine Learning-Based User Authentication 
Model Using Mobile App Data,” in International Conference on Intelligent and Fuzzy 
Systems (INFUS), 2019, pp. 408–415, (Best Paper Award). 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “A Behavior-Based Proactive User Authentication 
Model Utilizing Mobile Application Usage Patterns,” in 32nd Canadian Conference 
on Artificial Intelligence, 2019, pp. 284–295. 
• Y. Ashibani, D. Kauling, and Q. H. Mahmoud, “Design and Implementation of a 
Contextual-Based Continuous Authentication Framework for Smart Homes,” Applied 
System Innovation, vol. 2, no. 1, pp. 1–20, 2019. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “A User Authentication Model for IoT Networks 
Based on App Traffic Patterns,” in 9th IEEE Annual I Information Technology; 
Electronics and Mobile Communication Conference (IEMCON), 2018, pp. 632–638. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “A Behavior Profiling Model for User 
Authentication in IoT Networks based on App Usage Patterns,” in 44th IEEE Annual 
Conference of the Industrial Electronics Society (IECON), 2018, pp. 2841–2846. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “An Efficient and Secure Scheme for Smart Some 
Communication Using Identity-Based Signcryption,” in 36th IIEEE International 
Performance Computing and Communications Conference, IPCCC, 2017, pp. 1–7. 
v  
 
• Y. Ashibani, D. Kauling, and Q. H. Mahmoud, “A Context-Aware Authentication 
Framework for Smart Homes,” in 30th IEEE Canadian Conference on Electrical and 
Computer Engineering (CCECE), 2017, pp. 1–5. 
• Y. Ashibani and Q. H. Mahmoud, “Cyber Physical Systems Security: Analysis, 
Challenges and Solutions,” Journal of Computers and Security, Elsevier, vol. 68, pp. 
81–97, 2017. 
• Y. Ashibani, D. Kauling, and Q. H. Mahmoud, “Poster: A Context-Aware 
Authentication Service for Smart Homes,” in 14th IEEE Annual Consumer 


















Dedicated to my family, without their support and encouragement 






First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Qusay H. Mahmoud, for his 
generous support, continuous encouragement, and constant efforts to push me out of my 
comfort zone. Dr. Mahmoud has also helped tremendously in improving my research and 
communication skills. I cannot possibly quantify the importance of his academic guidance, 
recommendations, constant feedback, quick responses, and valuable advice during these 
past five years. He has unfailingly shared with me his time, resources, and judgment. 
Knowing him as someone who consistently cares about his students, I had the opportunity 
to discuss with him the obstacles encountered in my study and research. Dr. Mahmoud has 
not only helped me to develop academic skills, but has also encouraged me to strive for 
excellence. Dr. Mahmoud has guided and helped me improve several sections of my thesis. 
Without his valuable comments and sincere suggestions, which have significantly 
enhanced my work, this thesis would not have been completed. Therefore, many thanks go 
to him for his immense help in guiding me toward the successful completion of my Ph.D. 
studies. 
In addition, I would like to express deep gratitude to my other supervisory committee 
members, Dr. Khalil El-Khatib and Dr. Masoud Makrehchi, not only for their insightful 
comments and encouragement but also for encouraging me to widen my research from 
various perspectives. I would also like to thank the university examiner Dr. Patrick Hung 
and the external examiner, Dr. Abdelkader Ouda for their valuable feedback, and Dr. 
Shahryar Rahnamayan for chairing the thesis examination. 
viii  
 
I would also like to thank all my colleagues from the department for their continuous 
support and cooperation during these five years. I wish to express my appreciation to Mrs. 
Catherine Lee, Mr. Mark Neville, and Dr. Fernanda Batista as well, for their discussion, 
editing and proofreading of this thesis. My special thanks, appreciation, and gratitude also 
go to my parents. Together with all my family, their desire to see me accomplish this goal 
has sustained me on this colossal project. I thank them for always believing in me and 
supporting me. Their love and encouragement have been, and always will be, a great source 
of inspiration in my life.  
Lastly, but importantly, I want to thank my wife, my daughters, and my son for their 
patience throughout the duration of my Ph.D. studies, as well as for their understanding of 
my need to spend time away from them working and writing up my dissertation. Long 
nights and busy weekends have been the norm. While the work has seemed never-ending, 
they have always been there for me. Last but not least, I would also like to thank all those 
who have been directly and indirectly involved in building this thesis and research work.  
ix  
 
Table of Contents 
Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………… ii 
Acknowledgments …………………………………………………………………... vii 
Table of Contents …………………………………………………………………… ix 
List of Tables ………………………………………………………………………... xiii 
List of Figures …………………………………………………………………......... xiv 
List of Abbreviations ………………………………………………………………... xvi 
Chapter 1. Introduction ………………………………………………………......... 1 
 1.1 Overview …………………………………………………………………….. 1 
 1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement …………………………………………. 3 
 1.3 Research Objectives ……………………………………………………........ 6 
1.4 Research Contributions ……………………………………………………... 6 
 1.5 Thesis Outline ……………………………………………………………….. 7 
Chapter 2. Background and Related Work …………………………………......... 9 
 2.1 Introduction ………………………………………………………………….. 9 
 2.2 Authentication Mechanisms …………………………..…………………….. 10 
 2.3 Context-Based Authentication ……………….……………………………... 12 
       2.3.1 Contextual Information ……………………………………………….. 12 
       2.3.2 Authentication Methods …………….…………………………………. 16 
 2.4 Device Authentication ……………………………………………………….. 18 
 2.5 Continuous User Authentication Mechanisms ……………………................. 21 
       2.5.1 Behavioral Profiling-Based Authentication ………………………........ 22 
       2.5.2 Combined Authentication Mechanisms …………………….………….. 29 
x  
 
 2.6 Machine Learning Techniques for Behavioral-Based User Authentication …. 33 
       2.6.1 Supervised Learning …………………………………………………... 33 
 2.7 Discussion …………………………………….……………………………... 35 
 2.8 Summary ……………………………………….………………………........ 38 
Chapter 3. Proposed Solution …………………....………………………………… 40 
 3.1 Assumptions and Threat Model ………………………………….................... 40 
 3.2 Framework Architecture …………………………………………………….. 43 
       3.2.1 Contextual Information .……………….……………………..………... 45 
       3.2.2 Device-to-Device Message Authentication ……………………………. 45 
       3.2.3 User Authentication ……….....................……………………………... 46 
 3.3 Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme ……………………........ 48 
       3.3.1 Preliminaries …………………………………………………………... 48 
       3.3.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography ..……………………………………….. 48 
       3.3.1.2 Bilinear Pairing on Elliptic Curves ………………………………….. 50 
       3.3.1.3 Complexity Assumptions ……………………………………………. 52 
       3.3.1.4 Identity-Based Signcryption (IBS) …….………….............................. 52 
       3.3.2 Proposed IBS Scheme ……………………………................................. 53 
       3.3.2.1 System Initialization …………………………………………..…….. 53 
       3.3.2.2 Registration Stage ………………………………………………........ 54 
       3.3.2.3 Signcryption …………………………………………………………. 54 
       3.3.2.4 Unsigncryption ……………………………………………………… 56 
 3.4 App-Based User Authentication Model ……………………………………... 57 
       3.4.1 App Categories ……………………………………………………....... 58 
xi  
 
       3.4.2 Data Collection ……………………………………………………....... 59 
       3.4.3 Data Preprocessing and Feature Extraction ……………………………. 61 
       3.4.4 Classification Strategy ……………………………………………........ 64 
       3.4.5 User Authentication Unit …………………………………………........ 66 
       3.4.6 Decision Unit ………………………………………………………….. 67 
 3.5 Summary …………………………………………………………………….. 70 
Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation and Results ………………….……...……... 72 
 4.1 Prototype of Context-Based Authentication ..……………………………….. 72 
       4.1.1 Contextual-Based User Authentication ……………………………….. 75 
       4.1.2 Performance ………………………………………………………........ 76 
      4.1.3 Authentication weights and Device Thresholds …………..……........... 77 
       4.1.4 Scalability ………….………………………………………………….. 80 
      4.1.5 Comparison with Related Work …..………………………………........ 81 
4.2 Evaluation of Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme ………….. 81 
      4.2.1 Correctness …………………………………………………………….. 81 
      4.2.2 Results …………..……………………………………………………... 82 
4.3 Evaluation of App-Based User Authentication Model .……………………… 84 
      4.3.1 Evaluation Metrics …………………………………………………….. 85 
      4.3.2 Datasets ………………………………………………………………... 87 
      4.3.3 App Access Time Patterns and Network Traffic Patterns …………….. 88 
      4.3.4 App Access Events-Based User Authentication ……………………….. 93 
 4.4 Security Analysis ……………………………………….................................. 107 
xii  
 
       4.4.1 Context-Based Prototype………...…………………………………….. 107 
       4.4.2 Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme …………………... 109 
       4.4.3 App-Based User Authentication Model ………………………..……… 110 
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work …………………………………………. 111 
 
5.1 Conclusion …………………………………………………………………... 112 
 5.2 Future Work ……………………………………………………………........ 114 





List of Tables 
Chapter 2  
Table 2.1. A comparison of context-based authentication approaches …………......... 17 
Table 2.2. A comparison of behavioral profiling-based authentication approaches…… 24 
Chapter 3  
Table 3.1. Contextual information ………...……………………………..…………… 47 
Table 3.2. Definitions of notations …………..………………………………….......... 51 
Chapter 4  
Table 4.1. Specifications of devices used in the prototype implementation …………. 74 
Table 4.2. Performance of individual authentication methods ………………………… 76 
Table 4.3. Performance of authentication methods combined ……………………….. 76 
Table 4.4. Example of authentication weights for context parameters and threshold for 
accessing devices ………………………………………………………………........... 
 
78 
Table 4.5. Calculated confidence levels and authentication scenarios …………......... 79 
Table 4.6. Computational overhead and cipher-text length …………………………… 83 
Table 4.7. A Two-class confusion matrix ………………………………………......... 86 
Table 4.8. Statistical analysis of the extracted features in the UbiqLog4UCI dataset … 95 
Table 4.9. Statistical analysis of the extracted features in the LiveLab dataset ……….. 96 







List of Figures 
Chapter 1  
Figure 1.1. An example of a smart home environment ……………………………… 2 
Chapter 3  
Figure 3.1. A contextual authentication framework for smart home environments 43 
Figure 3.2. Operations of the proposed IBS scheme ………………………………… 53 
Figure 3.3. Architecture of the proposed app-based user authentication model.. ……. 58 
Figure 3.4. User authentication procedure…………………………………………… 66 
Chapter 4  
Figure 4.1. Architecture of the implemented prototype ……………………………... 73 
Figure 4.2. Snapshot of Apache JMeter multiple simultaneous requests …………… 80 
Figure 4.3. Historical data captured by the TS ……………………………………… 80 
Figure 4.4. F-measure performance of both access time and network traffic patterns… 91 




Figure 4.6. Number of interactions with apps per week for 12 weeks ………………. 98 
Figure 4.7. Number of utilized apps per week for 12 weeks ………………………… 98 
Figure 4.8. The average inter_pi for selected users for the UbiqLog4UCI dataset…… 99 
Figure 4.9. The average inter_pi for selected users for the LiveLab dataset ………… 99 
Figure 4.10. Model performance based on the number of interactions with apps for 
the UbiqLog4UCI dataset ……………………………………………………………. 
 
100 
Figure 4.11. Model performance based on the number of interactions with apps for 





Figure 4.12. Model performance on unseen data for the UbiqLog4UCI dataset …….. 101 
Figure 4.13. Model performance on unseen data for the LiveLab dataset …………… 101 
Figure 4.14. Model performance based on the number of enrolled users for the 
UbiqLog4UCI dataset ……………………………………………………………….. 
 
103 
Figure 4.15. Model performance based on the number of enrolled users for the 
LiveLab dataset ……………………………………………………………………... 
 
103 
Figure 4.16. Model performance based on simulated access requests for the 
UbiqLog4UCI dataset ………………………………………………………………... 
 
104 






List of Abbreviations 
AER Average Error Rate 
API Application Programming Interface 
EER Equal Error Rate 
FAR False Acceptance Rate 
FMR False Match Rate 
FRR False Rejection Rate 
HG Home Gateway 
IBE Identity-Based Encryption 
IBS Identity-Based Signcryption 
IoT Internet of Things 
KNN K-Nearest Neighbor 
TS Trusted Server 
MERR Median Equal Error Rate 
NB Naïve Bayes 
PIN Personal Identification Number 
RF Random Forest 
SVM Support Vector Machine 
TAR True Acceptance Rate 
TNR True Negative Rate 
TPR True Positive Rate 
TRR True Rejection Rate 
1 
 
Chapter 1. Introduction  
This chapter first provides an overview of smart home security and authentication 
techniques followed by motivation and problem statement, research contributions and the 
thesis structure. 
1.1  Overview 
A smart home can be defined as a home equipped with connected Internet-of-Things (IoT) 
devices that can be remotely accessed and controlled. In addition to providing access, 
monitoring and control of home devices, smart homes provide other services to home 
residents, such as entertainment and information storage, thus making users’ daily lives 
more comfortable [1]. SmartThings [2], Wink [3] and HomeKit [2] are examples of smart 
home platforms. These home platforms are built based on the cloud back-end, where 
control management and authentication are mostly performed through an installed 
application on end-user devices, such as smartphones and tablets. Consequently, access to 
smart home environments, as shown in Figure 1.1, is mostly achieved remotely through 
users’ end devices. These devices have become essential tools for accessing and operating 
smart home networks. Since the smartphone is susceptible to loss or theft, there is a need 
for a transparent authentication mechanism that can implicitly authenticate the user without 
requiring more explicit intervention. Thus, smart home networks should be enhanced with 
security measures that ensure the access request and control commands come from the 
authorized user. A solution can be achieved by utilizing the continuous authentication of 
the current user of the mobile device. Continuous authentication is the process of 
continuously checking the user’s identity at and beyond the login stage. One advantage of 
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implicit continuous authentication, which is based on user interaction, is that it provides 
security and usability while reducing explicit user intervention unless required.  
Considerable information, such as application (app) usage, can be extracted from mobile 
devices and used to support authentication either at the entry point or during the access 
session. In addition to the pre-installed apps by mobile companies, over two million mobile 
apps are available in major app stores as well as those added daily [4]. As well as the apps 
available in stores, the number of Android apps at Google Play are approximately two 
millions [5], in addition to those new apps that are added daily. The number of apps used 
is also increasing, with most interactions on mobile phone devices related to foreground 
apps.  
 
Figure 1.1. An example of a smart home environment 
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With an increasing number of apps being used on mobile phones, app usage behavior may 
provide discriminative information about users. Furthermore, app-based access 
exemplifies information on user patterns while interacting on mobile devices. For instance, 
the ability to continuously retrieve app usage profile data on mobile devices strengthens 
the argument for employing behavioral-based mechanisms for continuous user 
authentication. Behavior profiling, which has many advantages [6], including the ability to 
be continuously computed without the knowledge of the user, can be obtained without 
additional hardware. Utilizing user app interaction can be profiled on smartphones/tablets 
based on functions provided by most of the operating systems on these devices.   
Another important issue is that insecure communication from one home IoT device to 
another may lead to information disclosure which, in turn, could be targeted by attackers. 
Attacks against such devices, which often have limited capabilities and are usually 
connected through the Internet by commonly using less secure wireless media, might easily 
achieve access to sensitive data. Hence, an effective solution that secures communication 
among these devices is the cryptographic technique.  
1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement 
Mobile phones and tablets are becoming global end-user devices in smart home networks. 
Although access to a variety of home IoT devices can be achieved through end-user 
devices, these devices are susceptible to theft or loss. According to Kensington, 70 million 
smartphones are lost annually while 4.3% of company-issued smartphones are lost or stolen 
every year [7]. The use of these devices by unauthorized users could lead to unauthorized 
access to home IoT devices. Many examples of security attacks have been noted throughout 
the literature, such as unauthorized access to heating systems, baby monitors, air 
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conditioning, thermostats, and lighting systems [8][9][10][11], allowing access to home 
networks as a result of weak authentication methods being employed. Furthermore, 
regarding IoT security, Hewlett Packard [12] reported that 80% of tested devices had 
insufficient authentication or authorization, a further 80% showed privacy concerns, and 
70% used unencrypted communication channels. It is reported in [13] that some services 
add a layer of authentication to mobile devices, such as sending an additional password via 
SMS before logging onto the service’s website. However, this solution does not solve the 
problem when the mobile phone is stolen. For example, as a result of utilizing weak 
authentication credentials by users, the attacker would have everything necessary to access 
the service.  
According to the MacAfee Report 2019, IoT devices are still shipped with default 
usernames/passwords even though it is widely known that these credentials have been, and 
continue to be, used in attacks [14]. As reported in [15], many of the consumer IoT device 
manufacturers fail to either focus on security or offer security instructions to consumers. 
Moreover, default usernames and passwords are the most common information for 
attacking IoT devices [16], with around 57 % of known passwords used in the attacks. 
Additionally, IoT routers are the most targeted and attacked devices, accounting for 75 % 
of attacks due to accessibility gained from the internet [17]. Moreover, many smartphone 
users still adopt weak login credentials, including common or reusable passwords, or no 
password at all [18].  
Although the literature, such as [19],  presents a compound password approach, this does 
not guarantee that users will use them. Moreover, requiring users to enter security 
credentials on each specific occasion in order to be continuously authenticated is 
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undesirable. However, offering security mechanisms to users on end-devices with the 
option of bypassing them, even if they are enabled by default, does not guarantee that users 
will utilize such options to secure their devices and accessed services. Another important 
issue is related to acknowledgment that attacks might not only come from outside the 
system but also from inside.  
An additional issue that should be considered when retrieving information related to users 
is that of securing any sent messages. Therefore, transferring any information between 
home devices must be protected from disclosure. However, some terminal devices, such as 
sensors and actuators, do not have adequate data processing capabilities and 
communication abilities, or adequate storage capacities. Consequently, it is very 
challenging to implement these methods, especially by devices with limited computation 
capabilities.  
For continuous user authentication, some of the proposed solutions, such as those presented 
in [20][21][22][23] and [24], require a particular series of actions from the user for 
authentication, such as gesture recognition approaches which, in turn, eliminate the 
transparency of continuous authentication. However, only a few studies employ app 
profiling for continuous user authentication. Although the achieved results in such studies 
are prominent, the range of apps used in the evaluation was limited. In addition, these 
studies, as in [25], focus on appl-specific information, such as text messages and calling 
behavior, for detecting abnormal usage in the mobile environment. It should also be noted 
that the focus of the literature is on single modality in which the built models target single 
users. In other words, the focus of most of the listed studies is on the client-side; from 
activities on the mobile device, the built profile detects illegal usage of the device from the 
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modeled user profile. In order to protect transmitted messages between IoT devices, many 
lightweight security schemes based on symmetric-key cryptography have been proposed. 
These schemes need a number of shared symmetric keys for each party. If the shared key 
is compromised, all the communicated messages will be compromised. For providing 
higher security, public-key cryptography has been used. However, public-key 
cryptography still needs a certificate for each public key, which is considered to be a 
complex process [26].   
1.3 Research Objectives 
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the design and evaluation of a contextual 
authentication framework for smart home environments. This framework includes a user 
authentication model that protects smart home IoT devices from unauthorized access. 
Information exchange security between home IoT devices is also considered to protect any 
transferred messages among home IoT devices. 
1.4 Research Contributions 
The significant contribution of this thesis is a contextual authentication framework for 
smart home environments, and the individual contributions that embody the framework 
are: 
• A context-based user authentication method. This method enhances the knowledge-
based authentication with contextual information which ensures the authenticity of a 
user beyond the point-of-entry. The implementation and evaluation of a proof of 
concept prototype as well as the utilization of contextual information for context-based 
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user authentication are presented. Results from this research have been published in 
[149][154][155]. 
• An identity-based signcryption scheme for information exchange among smart 
home IoT devices. The presented scheme is based on identity-based cryptography and, 
in addition to providing authentication, it provides integrity and confidentiality as well 
as the ability to protect communication among devices against various possible attacks.  
This scheme is more efficient regarding computational cost and cipher-text length 
compared to other existing signcryption schemes. Results from this research have been 
published in [156]. 
• An app-based user authentication model. This model is able to authenticate 
registered users utilizing app interactions with considerably high accuracy. This model 
does not require specific action from the user in order to be authenticated; rather, it is 
based on regular actions while accessing apps, which enhances usability. Results from 
this research have been published in [86][[93][94]125][145][148].  
1.5 Thesis Outline 
This thesis considers the aforementioned research objectives and consists of five chapters 
as follows:  
Chapter 1 presents an overview, motivation and problem statement followed by the 
research objectives and contributions of the thesis.  
Chapter 2 reviews the literature regarding user authentication mechanisms, which are 
organized into three classifications: common authentication, contextual-based 
authentication, and continuous authentication. Next, it reviews device-to-device message 
authentication mechanisms and presents a discussion and summary. 
Chapter 3 introduces the proposed framework, assumptions, threat model, as well as the 
individual components of this framework including a context-based user authentication 
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method, a device-to-device message authentication scheme, and an app-based user 
authentication model. 
Chapter 4 presents the implementation of the proof of concept prototype, the experimental 
evaluation results, and the security analysis. 
Chapter 5 concludes the research by summarizing the findings and limitations as well as 




Chapter 2. Background and Related Work 
This chapter reviews the relevant literature regarding user authentication and divides the 
presented authentication mechanisms into three classifications: common authentication, 
context-based authentication, and continuous authentication mechanisms. This chapter also 
reviews the literature related to proposed public cryptographic mechanisms for smart 
homes. 
2.1 Introduction 
Authentication has been utilized within different technologies, such as mobile phones, 
mobile networks, and web browsing, for either the client-side or the server-side [27]. From 
the client-side perspective, the studies in [28][29][30] utilize features, such as opened files, 
including how frequently these files are accessed while accessing a computer system in 
order to detect unauthorized access. From the server-side perspective, other research 
studies, such as [31][32], have investigated the potential to build a user profile based on 
web accessed activities in order to identify users. The utilized features in these studies 
include the visited website name, start time, and the number of browsed pages. Other 
studies have adopted third-party mechanisms to offload user behavior model training and 
authentication processes. As an example, in [33], the SmartThings home platform performs 
authentication and authorization based on user actions in accessing IoT home devices. The 
authentication procedure is achieved either at the cloud back-end or at the SmartHub 
controller in the smart home network. Several mechanisms for user and device 
authentication, which can be adopted for smart homes, have been identified in the literature. 
Accordingly, this chapter reviews the literature and divides the presented user 
authentication mechanisms into three classifications: common authentication, context-
10 
 
based authentication, and continuous authentication mechanisms. Another issue involves 
the security of transmitting information among home IoT devices. For example, if an 
adversary exploits a transmitted message, it will threaten data integrity and confidentiality. 
Hence, transferring any information that can be utilized for characterizing user behavior 
must be protected from disclosure. One important aspect of security regarding data 
transmission is device-to-device message authentication. On the issue of securing 
communication between smart home IoT devices, this chapter also reviews the literature 
related to two aspects: proposed public cryptographic mechanisms for smart homes and 
proposed public cryptographic mechanisms that can be adopted for smart homes. 
2.2 Authentication Mechanisms 
The most common authentication mechanisms as presented in the literature fall into three 
categories: knowledge-based authentication, object-based authentication, and biometrics. 
The first category consists of knowledge-based authentication approaches such as 
passwords and PINs. This approach needs users to remember authentication credentials, 
which may be susceptible to attacks in scenarios such as brute-force, dictionary, and 
phishing attacks. Although, as demonstrated in [34], the password is still the preferred 
option for authentication by many users and easy to implement [35], many incidents of 
password attacks have occurred during the last few years [36]. For example, credentials of 
over 7 million accounts were leaked in 2016 from a community on Minecraft. Additionally, 
hackers typically publish breached credentials on public online lists such as the Anti Public 
Combo List, which contains more than 500 million credentials leaked during the past 
several years [37]. Furthermore, there have been recent attacks resulting in the breach of 4 
billion username-password pairs in Google’s database [38]. Single-Sign-On (SSO) is a user 
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authentication technique that reduces the frequent authentication of the user; however, it 
only identifies the identity not the user [39][40]. Although this method can remove from 
users the burden of providing login credentials for many apps, it could increase the risk of 
hacking any other apps that can be accessed under the same authentication if, for example, 
the login credentials are accessed by an attacker. Moreover, SSO is still a point-of-entry 
that assumes that the legitimate user is the one who accesses the service throughout the 
entire access session [40]. Furthermore, it is impractical to require users to continuously 
provide knowledge-based credentials to prove their presence during the access session.   
The second category consists of possession-based authentication approaches, such as using 
tokens, which have been developed for overcoming the drawbacks that come with 
knowledge-based approaches. Token-based authentication methods can be classified into 
two types: hardware tokens and software tokens. Hardware token mechanisms need the 
user to carry physical tokens. For example, a continuous authentication method for 
wearable wireless devices is suggested in [41]. As an example, in [42] a transient 
authentication mechanism is proposed for user authentication through small hardware 
tokens. Taking into account that such tokens are susceptible to theft or loss, this approach 
is impractical.  
Software tokens utilize the end-user device by, for example, sending the password as a 
message to the user’s registered device, such as a smartphone or tablet, to be used for 
logging into the service. Software tokens can be in the form of installed software on the 
end-user device which can issue new passwords in the form of a One Time Password 
(OTP), such as Google Authenticator [40][43], that changes with every access time. 
Software token-based authentication has some advantages over both hardware token-based 
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and knowledge-based authentication techniques as it removes from users the burden of 
having to carry physical tokens and remember and choose robust passwords. However, it 
is inconvenient for users to have to continuously input the generated passwords for 
continuous authentication throughout the entire access session in addition to the drawback 
of possible access to the end-user device by an unauthorized user. 
The third technique for overcoming the limitations of using knowledge-based and object-
based authentication approaches is the biometrics technique which is divided into 
physiological and behavioral. The use of physiological biometric, such as iris and 
fingerprint recognition, is being used where users are expected to access required services 
[44][45]. Biometric features, such as fingerprints, can be considered as robust for user 
authentication. However, for the sake of continuous authentication, it would be 
inconvenient to require users to re-enter their biometrics every time. As observed from 
these three authentication mechanisms, there is a need for an implicit authentication 
mechanism that can provide continuous authentication during the access session.  
2.3 Context-Based Authentication 
This section first presents the definition of the contextual information in the literature, the 
taxonomy and quality of the contextual information, and reviews context-based 
authentication approaches.  
2.3.1 Contextual Information 
Although there are many contextual information classifications, there is still no unified 
definition for contextual information. Many researchers consider the following definition 
as appropriate: “Context is any information that can be used to characterize the situation of 
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an entity. An entity is a person, place, or object that is considered relevant to the interaction 
between a user and an application, including the user and applications [46][47]”. Context 
includes any information that is related to a user’s situation, such as location, device status, 
and any information related to the environment, such as temperature, loudness, and 
brightness.  
Another classification of security-relevant contextual attributes includes physical 
environment context, (e.g., time or temperature); service type context (e.g., premium or 
basic service); user’s context (e.g., location); platform context (e.g., trusted state of the 
platform); and particular transaction (e.g., an electronic token or electronic receipt) [48]. 
In addition, contextual information includes personal contexts (e.g., preferences); activity 
contexts (e.g., meeting schedule or shopping list); physical contexts (e.g., time and 
location) [46]; device contexts (e.g., power and display size); systematic contexts (e.g., 
network bandwidth); application contexts (e.g., agent and service); and environmental 
contexts (e.g., light level) [49][50]. 
There are many contextual information classifications. For example, [51] classifies 
contextual information based on operational categorization to sensed, static, profiled, and 
derived contexts. In [52], contextual information is classified based on three common 
questions regarding where you are, who you are with, and what resources are nearby. 
However, from a security perspective, especially for the authentication process, contextual 
information can be classified as follows: 
• Direct Contextual Information: This can be achieved directly without performing 
operations on, or modifying, the contextual values (e.g., activities or historical 
movement information) as well as social relationships (e.g., friends and family). Direct 
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contextual information, which is mentioned in [53] as the primary context, includes any 
retrieved contextual information without relying on already existing contextual 
information. Direct contextual information includes: 
o User context: any information about the user such as profile, calendar, social 
networks, and access patterns 
o Device context: any information related to the used end-device which can be 
retrieved from sensors [54][55], such as location, current and voltage values, 
Wi-Fi access points, operating systems, and running/installed apps 
o Network data: IP address, media access control address (MAC address), link 
speed, ping times, and traceroutes 
o Environmental context: any information related to the physical environment, 
such as temperature, weather, lighting, loudness, or humidity 
• Indirect Contextual Information: This can be indirectly achieved by performing 
operations on or modifying the contextual values: for example, calculating power 
consumption using voltage and current values or speed from multiple GPS locations. 
This classification is mentioned in [53] with the term ‘secondary contextual 
information’, which refers to any contextual information resulting from performing any 
operation on existing contextual information. 
• Other classifications: Contextual information can also be classified based on the status 
of the system and its characteristics, as well as the resource of the involved contextual 
information attributes. Such classifications could include:  
o Static contextual information: contextual information that changes very slowly 
or does not change at all, and includes the address and name of the user  
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o Dynamic contextual information: contextual information that changes over 
time, such as time and location of the user 
o Internal contextual information: contextual information that is retrieved from 
the used devices by the user including battery level, and current and voltage 
readings  
o External contextual information: contextual information that can be retrieved 
from external resources such as the location of the user, as retrieved from the 
cellular network 
Another important factor regarding retrieved contextual information that is related to 
security is quality of the contextual information (QoC). The quality is based on the 
accuracy and trust of the received values. While accuracy is often desirable in apps such as 
GPS location tracking, [56] mentions that the QoC is only related to the information itself, 
and does not involve the resource that provides the contextual information or the performed 
processes. Thus, it is important to consider QoC regarding the accuracy and trust of the 
received values. Many different methods [57] can be adopted for measuring the quality of 
contextual information. The popular approaches include: 
• Statistical analysis, which is based on mathematical models to exclude unreliable 
values. For example, retrieving the temperature and pressure values from different 
resources and discarding any anomalous values. Statistical analysis is an effective 
approach that can be applied especially to environmental contextual information, and 
also when having multiple resources of the received contextual information. 
• Confidence value, which is based on assigning different confidence values for the 
involved authentication tools and the used devices. As an example, physical tokens 
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have higher confidence values than knowledge-based credentials such as username and 
password. In this thesis, higher confidence values will be assigned to the retrieved 
contextual information based on the trust of the related resource. For instance, by 
considering MAC address spoofing, a MAC address will be assigned a lower 
confidence value. In addition, the confidence level will be assigned based on 
information resulting from historical analysis of long-term contextual information. 
2.3.2 Authentication Methods 
Other research studies offer several solutions that utilize contextual information in two 
ways: either by integrating this information as an authentication adaptation or as additional 
authentication factors [46]. As previously mentioned, the knowledge-based authentication 
and object-based approaches only prove the presence of the identity, and not the actual 
user. Thus, if credentials or tokens are stolen, loaned, misused or forged, there will be no 
proof of the user’s legitimacy. In general, authentication approaches that are based on 
usernames and passwords or tokens prove only the presence of the identity, and not the 
user. Consequently, if an illegitimate user is using the end-user’s device before the expiry 
of the access session, all apps and services that are accessed via this device could be 
accessed by unauthorized persons if there is no technique for verifying if the current user 
is authorized one. Much research has been conducted to enhance traditional authentication 
techniques with contextual information. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of relevant 
related works regarding utilized information, advantages, and limitations. A contextual 
attribute authentication model for mobile environments is defined in [48]. However, this 
model only includes location and e-receipt as contextual information. The authors in [58] 
provide an authentication approach that involves GPS location, time and the tasks 
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performed on the operating system. However, their approach considers location based on 
a GPS signal that will not be available when accessing services indoors.  
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Based on the assumption that mobile users tend to use their apps in different locations at 
different times, location-based authentication is described in [25]. Assuming that users 
perform similar tasks at certain times during weekdays, a user profile approach that gathers 
behavioral information, such as sent text messages (SMS), calls and geographic location, 
is proposed in [39]. For observed actions, such as habitual or good events, this approach 
assigns a score. The study in [60] proposes an anomaly-based detection system based on 
monitoring users’ actions, such as sending SMS messages or making calls. Additionally, 
other studies, such as [25][39] and [60], consider SMS and calling behavior for abnormal 
usage detection. As the number of mobile apps increases, SMS and calling functions are 
being ignored and replaced with apps that achieve the same purpose. In addition, 
unauthorized users who access mobile devices will, most probably, tend to operate 
inconspicuously; hence these functions provide insufficient evidence of the intended user.  
An authentication method for wearable wireless devices is suggested in [41]. In [42], a 
transient authentication mechanism is proposed for user authentication through small 
hardware tokens, limiting access to the use of location-based contexts. The research in [59] 
provides a context security framework utilizing proximity and does not provide an 
implementation and evaluation of the proposed framework. 
2.4 Device Authentication  
In recent years, many schemes have been proposed for securing communication either 
intended or that could be adopted for smart homes. For communication between any two 
devices, many available devices in the market are provided with the ability to secure 
communication with a pre-shared symmetric key which should be exchanged in advance 
for encrypting and decrypting any transmitted messages. This approach requires a regular 
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key exchange among devices. If the used key is compromised, especially when perfect 
forward secrecy protocols (PFS) are not utilized, all communicated messages will be 
compromised [61]. For example, the authors in [62] and [63] present a lightweight 
cryptographic technique for resource-constrained devices by combining symmetric and 
asymmetric cryptography, providing confidentiality, integrity and authentication. 
However, the proposed technique mainly depends on symmetric cryptography for data 
encryption.  
A lightweight encryption scheme for smart homes that provides confidentiality with less 
overhead in computation and communication is presented in [64]. The scheme adopts 
Identity Based Encryption (IBE), which requires less public key management. The authors 
also provide a security analysis showing the efficiency of the proposed scheme. However, 
the focus of the proposed scheme is mainly on confidentiality. Moreover, it is based on 
symmetric encryption for message encryption, which weakens the security of the proposed 
scheme. A common symmetric key that is automatically generated according to extracted 
parameters from wireless multi-path channels is presented in [65]. This approach is mainly 
intended for devices that support 802.11a protocol. The feasibility of this approach being 
handled by many devices is still debatable as not all smart home devices support 802.11a 
protocol. A radio frequency for consumer electronics secure key pairing protocol is 
proposed in [66]. For authentication, the proposed scheme requires each device to 
communicate with its manufacturer. In this technique, each involved device is required to 
send authentication information to its manufacturer through a mobile operator in order to 
be authenticated. This scheme is based on symmetric-key cryptography, and there is always 
a need for access to the device’s manufacturer in order to be authenticated. A security 
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scheme that provides three levels of authentications among gateway, smart meter, smart 
appliances and the home area network is proposed in [67]. However, the provided scheme 
mainly depends on a third party (e.g., the Internet service provider) for providing three 
authentication levels between the devices.  
A secure smart household appliance framework (S2A) has been proposed in [68]. The focus 
of this framework is on providing safe operations, smart home safety and electricity price 
control. For reliable security protection, this framework employs machine learning but does 
not account for device authentication, integrity and data confidentiality, which are the main 
security goals. A key establishment protocol for smart homes is presented in [69]. This 
protocol requires a trusted certificate authority for providing public and private keys. 
Although the authors provide limited security analysis, it needs to be emphasized that 
involving traditional public-key cryptography requires a third party for certification and, in 
turn, produces more overhead on constrained devices.  
The authors in [70] propose a lightweight mutual message authentication scheme for 
reducing the number of exchanged messages during authentication. Although the proposed 
scheme provides two-step mutual authentication, it uses public-key encryption. The 
authors in [71] propose a framework in which a local home server authenticates a remote 
user on behalf of smart devices, utilizing fingerprint and location. Communication between 
a gateway and smart devices is assumed to be secured by other schemes. The research in 
[72] presents an approach to securing interaction between RFID-tagged consumer items, 
RFID-reader enabled appliances and RFID-based applications. However, the proposed 
approach, which is only a conceptual idea, assumes that the home appliances are RFID 
supported. Kerberos is a network authentication protocol that requires a third party (a key 
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distribution centre) to achieve temporary keys to access locations on the network. 
Consequently, Kerberos allows for secure and robust authentication without transmission 
of passwords [73]. OAuth 2.0 is an open standard framework that enables a third-party app 
to obtain limited access to a service without providing authentication credentials. OAuth is 
about authorization since it does not transmit authentication information between clients 
and service providers [74]. In comparison with OAuth, OpenID is a distributed 
(decentralized) open identity standard authentication which delegated authentication using 
a third party. OpenID eliminates the need for providing login credentials and allows users 
to log into multiple websites without providing separate credentials for each website 
[75][76]. 
2.5 Continuous User Authentication Mechanisms 
As of result of the difficulty inherent in both knowledge-based and object-based 
authentication mechanisms for continuous and transparent user authentication, the focus 
has turned to behavioral-based authentication [40]. In addition, the ability to continuously 
utilize usage app profiles and sensor data on end-user devices strengthens the argument for 
employing behavioral-based mechanisms for continuous user authentication. Behavioral-
based authentication is centred on the assumption that users have stable and distinct usage 
patterns while employing end-user devices [77]. Additionally, behavioral-based 
authentication mechanisms identify users according to unique behaviors, such as the usage 
pattern of the apps on the device, the way they walk while handling a device, and the way 
they hold the device during usage.  
Moreover, behavioral-based authentication has many advantages such as the ability to 
provide continuous and implicit authentication of users beyond the point-of-entry. 
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Although behavioral authentication techniques can be affected by a change in the 
discriminatory characteristics of the user [78][79], this variation can be minimized by long-
term behavior analysis and regular updates. In addition, behavioral authentication 
techniques do not require explicit user intervention. Furthermore, a study presented in [80] 
shows that a transparent and continuous authentication is desired by users on mobile 
devices. Although there are different mechanisms that consider behavioral-based user 
authentication in the literature, in this chapter we only consider behavioral profiling 
authentication and combined authentication mechanisms which are described in the 
following subsections. 
2.5.1 Behavioral Profiling-Based Authentication 
The behavioral profiling-based authentication technique is mainly established on the 
hypothesis that users present a unique behavior, such as working on a specific app in a 
specific period. Much research has been conducted into enhancing user authentication by 
utilizing behavior profiling. This type of behavior can be modeled by capturing app usage 
logs from end-user devices. Behavior profiling for authentication, which started in the late 
1990s, can be classified as either network-based or host-based. Network-based behavior 
profiling, such as described in [81], utilizes user calling and migration behavior over the 
service provider network for building a user behavior profile. In contrast, host-based 
behavior profiling, as described in [25], is based on the hypothesis that mobile users tend 
to use their apps at different times in different locations. Table 2.2 provides a comparison 
of relevant related works regarding utilized information, advantages, and limitations.  
Drawing on the assumption that most users are prone to performing similar tasks at a 
certain time of day, the authors in [39] present a method that creates user profiles by 
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collecting behavioral information such as geographic location, phone calls and SMSs. 
Their approach assigns a score to observed events such as a good or habitual event. An 
experimental result in [25] shows that app-level behavior profiling is able to discriminate 
between users and detect anomalies in the course of interaction with a device, which in turn 
enables implicit and continuous authentication for users. The achieved results in the 
evaluation of this method on data from 30 users for one month include EER=13.5%, 35.1% 
and 35.7% for telephone calling, device usage and Bluetooth scanning.  
Additionally, it is demonstrated in [82] that user behavior is, in fact, subject to the app 
being employed by the users. An anomaly-based detection system that monitors the actions 
of users, such as calls, SMSs and Web browsing on mobile phones, is presented in [60]. 
For performance evaluation of this work, four different machine learning classifiers were 
applied. Two behavioral features considered in the proposed solution in  [83] are the time 
of the last email viewed by the user and the GPS location. These features are derived from 
the mobile device that is used. The study in [84], which presents a user authentication 
method based on telephone calls, basic app-level usage, and Bluetooth scanning, achieved 
an EER of 13.5%, 35.1% and 35.7%, respectively. In [85], the same authors subsequently 
present a behavior profiling framework that rejects a user’s access based on the number of 
consecutive abnormal app usages. The evaluation results of this framework record an EER 
of 13.5% for basic apps, 5.4% for telephone calls, 2.2% for SMS and 9.8% for multi-
instance. The authors in  [86] show that authentication accuracy is subject to the day of the 
week and conclude that access to apps during weekends, when some apps are mostly 
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module deployed in a 
smartphone and 
training module is 
executed on a PC. 
Requires a particular series of 
actions; Utilizes two 
classification modules for 
every gesture to deal with 
each orientation mode; This 
study excludes new apps. 
[22] Accelerometer-based gait; 
recognition; 36 users; k-nearest 




well in a controlled 
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subjects walk on flat 
floor.  
Requires a particular series of 
actions; Needs 30 seconds for 
authentication; 
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based on 30 seconds’ walk 





Keystroke; 18 users; EER < 
2%, FAR = 11%, FRR =16%. 
Two-factor 
authentication 
without carrying more 
hardware. 
Requires a particular series of 




Calls, SMS, Web browsing 
history; 35 iPhone users for 100 
calls, 1698 SMS and 13 Web 
browsing history; One-vs-all; 
Bayesian networks, RBF, 
KNN, random forest (RF), 
SVM, Multi-layer Perceptron 
(MLP); Average TPR=99.3%, 
Average FPR < 0.7%, Average 
EER=1.6%. 
Provides illegitimate 
user detection and 
assigns a score to 
observed events such 
as a good or habitual 
event. 
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apps that achieve the same 
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score for authentication 
decision.  




Considers only one app and 
uses only GPS location, 
which will not be available in 
most cases, especially 







101 unique apps or telephone 
numbers, calls, SMSs for four 
weeks; One-vs-all; RBF, MLP 
EER= 9.8%, FRR=11.45%, 
FAR= 4.17%. 
Continuously verifies 
mobile users.   
Verification will not be 
performed unless a total of 6 
applications have been 
utilized; Evaluation is based 
on simulation users; This 
study excludes new apps. 
[87] Apps usage, location, clock 
time, gesture, voice, touch; One 
class per user and single model 
Combines several 
features, resulting in 
SMS count only for the past 
hour in addition to the time 
and GPS location; SMS and 
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per user; Naïve Bayes; FAR, 
FRR, TAR, TRR.  
universal and unique 
modality for users. 
calling functions are ignored 
and replaced with apps that 
achieve the same purpose; 




Unique app usage data; 26 users 
and 99 users from different 
datasets; Verification models 
per user trained only on positive 
samples; EER= 16:16%, EER= 
up to 31.82 from unforeseen 
apps. 
 
Presents a continuous 
authentication model 
for smartphones 




The proposed approach needs 
2-5 minutes of app usage to 
detect an intrusion. In 
addition, it considers apps 
from different languages 
which can be easily 
discriminate between users; 
For the active authentication 
problem, the preferred 
language of the user is a type 
of behavioral data that can be 
used to discriminate between 
users; Considers apps that are 




Text entered via soft keyboard, 
apps, websites visited, location; 
One-vs-all; SVMs; ERR of 5% 
after one minute of user 
interaction with the device, and 
an EER of 1% after 30 minutes. 
Utilizes both GPS and 
WiFi based location.  
A binary classifier is 
constructed for each of the 
200 users and four modalities; 
It requires a total of 800 
classifiers; Requires five-
minute threshold for what is 
considered an idle period; 
This study excludes new apps. 
[90] Power consumption of six 
popular apps; Uses an on-line 
power estimation tool to 
determine system-level power 
consumption; Average EER of 
less than 10%. 
Requires no external 
measurement 
equipment. 
Uses built-in battery voltage 
sensors and knowledge of 
battery discharge behavior to 
monitor power consumption; 
Modeling power consumption 
only for specific apps is 
challenging due to other apps 
running in the background. 
[91] Touchscreen logs; 41 users; 
SVM, KNN; Misclassification 
EER in the range of 0% to 4%, 
Median EER of 0% for 
intrasession authentication; 







from raw touchscreen 
interaction data.  
For the primary study, overall 
experiment time ranged 
between 25 to 50 minutes per 
subject; For huge datasets, the 
limitation of this method is 
that not all data can be stored. 
[92] Most used apps and location; EER 
=9.004% with the first dataset; 
EER=1.98% with the second 
dataset. 
Presents a continuous 
authentication for 
smartphone user 
based on app usage 
data. 
Evaluation of the proposed 
approach is based on ten 
consecutive days of training 




A  user behavior profiling that describes where, when, how and with what the devices were 
used, is proposed in [87]. A user authentication approach that utilizes the access history of 
app usage events employing only a small amount of information is reported in [93]. The 
work in [88] presents a continuous authentication model on smartphones based on app 
usage data. The achieved results in the evaluation of this method include an average of 
EER=16% from the first dataset and 30% based on 50 historic observations sample from 
the second dataset. However, the study considers all apps, including those that are only 
used by individual users. In addition, it utilizes apps from different languages; however, 
for the active authentication problem, the preferred language of the user is a type of 
behavioral data that can be used to discriminate between users. The work in [93] is 
extended in [94], which presents user authentication models utilizing app access history. 
Two real-world datasets are used to validate the model using only shared apps during the 
same daily intervals. The work in [92] presents a behavior profiling technique for user 
authentication on smartphones based on app usage data. For authenticating users, this 
method considers app names, the day and time, as well as the app use duration. Two 
datasets are used in the evaluation, and the achieved results include EER=9.004% from the 
first dataset and EER=1.98% from the second dataset.  
In addition, the research reported in [93] shows that app access patterns, as well as the 
traffic generated during app access, can be applied for user authentication with reasonable 
accuracy. Furthermore, the evaluation in these studies was based on classifying individual 
access events to apps. These techniques presented in the related work use previous user 
access activity to build user usage profiles and then apply these profiles in order to identify 
legitimate users. Usage pattern profiling has been considered in many studies for many 
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purposes such as authentication and intrusion as well as fraud detection. For example, SMS 
and calling behavior are considered in [25][39][60][89]. Mobile device sensors have been 
considered for identifying users, including an approach in [95] that identifies and 
authenticates users based on accelerometer data. This approach considers contextual 
information as user activities, such as walking, climbing stairs and jogging. The authors in 
[96] devised a method for utilizing accelerometers in television remote controls in order to 
identify individuals. In [95], an approach that identifies and authenticates users based on 
accelerometer data is proposed. This approach considers contextual information as user 
activities, such as walking, climbing stairs and jogging. The achieved accuracy in this work 
is 72.2%, and the used dataset was generated by users repeating a limited set of pre-defined 
activities. Authenticating users of a smartphone according to accelerometer-based gait 
recognition, using the k-NN algorithm, is proposed in [22]. This approach, which records 
data as the user is walking, is built on the assumption that different individuals have 
different walking patterns. This method needs 30 seconds for authentication and requires 
users to follow a script. An approach that utilizes mobile sensor data for human activity 
recognition is suggested in [97]. This approach processes accelerometer data on the cloud 
using three different classification algorithms: Naïve Bayes (NB) Classifier and KNN.  
A further study presents an approach for authenticating a user by gesture recognition while 
holding a mobile device with an embedded accelerometer sensor [98]. The achieved results 
in the evaluation of this work include an ERR of 2.01% and 4.82% on a dataset of 100 
users. However, these approaches require a particular series of actions to be authenticated. 
Furthermore, other studies such as [99] and [100], show that employing more sensors can 
improve authentication performance and accuracy. The main limitation of employing 
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sensor measurements for authentication, as presented in the previous studies, is that the 
majority of the related works are intended for user authentication on end-user devices with 
the assumption of dynamic movement of the user during interaction with the end-device. 
Therefore, it is difficult to establish authentication without proper data availability. 
Another approach to modeling user behavior profiling involves utilizing the power 
consumption on the used device in order to characterize the user’s behavior. For example, 
the authors in [101] demonstrate that the operation of a particular device driver leads to 
varying power consumption on the used device. A power estimation model, based on 
leveraged real user behavior, is presented in [102]. This study describes the high correlation 
between user behavior patterns and system power consumption patterns. A power model 
construction technique for monitoring the power consumption of each app on an electronic 
device is presented in [90]. This approach, which utilizes built-in battery voltage sensors 
and knowledge of battery discharge behavior, achieved an absolute Average Error Rate 
(AER) of less than 10%. However, it is challenging to model power consumption only for 
specific apps due to other apps running in the background.  
Other approaches utilize behavioral traits such as gait, keystroke dynamics [103], gesture 
recognition and touch interactions for continuous user authentication. A user authentication 
method for mobile devices based on touchlogger is explained in [104]. This study shows 
that misuses or intrusions can be detected from touch events by using touchlogger. A 
different authentication technique with devices that use touch screen patterns is presented 
in [91]. Such devices are provided with touch screen capabilities to uncover input patterns. 
Based on the assumption that users perform predefined repetitive tasks, a study of touch 
screen behavior, as described in [91], was performed on 41 users to test the applicability 
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of screen touches. In this study, the authors were able to achieve results of misclassification 
error rates in the range of 0% to 4%. Although it demonstrated the ability to realize a 
satisfactory performance of matching gestures, the analysis was limited to vertical and 
horizontal swipes on the used app. In this study, 30 touch features were extracted and, for 
training the user profile, the KNN classifier and the Gaussian RBF kernel SVM were used.  
A user authentication method that uses a gesture recognition algorithm is proposed in [20]. 
This model utilizes user touch screen interactions in addition to device feedback vibrations. 
Continuous authentication for smartphones based on smartphone gesture patterns is 
presented in [21]. The authors in [105] determine the possibility of developing new user 
authentication mechanisms by utilizing multi-touch gestures. A study of utilizing and 
analysing gait data is made in [106]. This study involved 11 volunteers, with an achieved 
accuracy of 79.1% and 92.7%, respectively. The gait characteristics of a user, based on six 
gait signature metrics according to the rate of changes of acceleration data, is presented in 
[107]. In [108] and [109], the authors described a method, also based on gait recognition, 
for determining whether the owner is using the device.  
2.5.2 Combined Authentication Mechanisms 
In order to enhance knowledge-based authentication credentials, many researchers have 
considered combining multiple methods. A method for user authentication that combines 
touch traces with pressure features on a mobile device is presented in [110]. A further user 
authentication method that combines different sensor data, for example, acceleration, 
keystrokes and touch interactions is proposed in [111]. For continuous identity verification 
in web services after initial knowledge login, a solution presented in [112] combines 
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keystroke dynamics with mouse dynamics for continuously identifying users. The results 
obtained in the evaluation of this work have an overall EER of 8.21%.  
A research study reported in [113] shows that adding the features of size and pressure to 
keystroke dynamics can considerably enhance performance. A continuous user monitoring 
approach based on touch gestures, physical movement and power consumption is presented 
in [82]. This method was evaluated for the same device by 73 volunteer participants and 
obtained an EER with a range of 6.1% to 6.9% for 59 selected users. Combining both a 
keystroke and a handwriting method for user authentication via a screen sensor is 
developed in [23].  For authentication on a smartphone, using combinations of user 
behavioral pattern features of five basic user movements, such as sliding up, down, right, 
and left, is explained in [21]. A non-intrusive authentication method that employs 
orientation sensor data using the KNN classification is proposed in [114]. The authors 
further mention that combining multiple sensor inputs would improve accuracy. A new 
mobile system framework (SenSec) is introduced in [24]. In this framework, an 
accelerometer and gyroscope, along with magnetometer data, are continuously gathered 
during usage of the device in order to build a gesture model.  
A lightweight, temporally and spatially aware user behavior model for authentication that 
is based on both hard and soft sensors is introduced in [115]. Four different attacks, 
including insider attacks, with the ability of detection in 717 seconds, are considered in this 
work. However, the authors did not quantitatively corroborate the accuracy of the model. 
The authors in [99] describe a continuous and transparent motion-based user authentication 
for smartphones, which utilizes orientation, accelerometer and magnetometer embedded 
sensors in the device. This proposed approach is constructed on user movement profiling, 
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using SVM as a binary class classifier for authentication. Although this study claimed a 
90% accuracy, the used datasets were for the duration of five days and three weeks.  
A continuous and implicit user authentication service is proposed in [116]. This approach 
is based on four sensors on a mobile system: voice, location, locomotion and multitouch. 
This method only visually shows that different users have different touch traces, without 
showing how to authenticate users using these traces. Research studies have widely 
considered that the combination of behavioral biometrics with knowledge-based and 
object-based authentication methods, such as passwords and tokens, can enhance 
authentication accuracy. In order to verify users, the authors of [117] propose combining 
both biometric techniques with gestural input on a multi-touch surface. This approach was 
able to achieve an accuracy of 90%. TouchIn, a two-factor authentication system that 
combines behavioral profiling with a password on multi-touch mobile devices, is presented 
in [118].  
In order to improve the performance of keystroke dynamics-based authentication, a 
mechanism of combining the user’s normal typing pattern with a password is proposed in 
[119]. The aim of this method is to increase the strength of the used password in comparison 
with passwords. For user authentication on mobile devices, the authors in [120] combine 
speaker identification and face recognition. A two-factor authentication system that 
combines touch gestures and graphical passwords on mobile phones is presented in [121].  
A method that continuously authenticates the user’s identity on a smartphone, based on 
finger movement and touch movement, is proposed in [21]. Seventy-five users participated 
in this experiment and, for verification, an SVM training model was created. In the 
evaluation results, the best FAR of 4% and FRR of 4% could be approximately achieved. 
32 
 
The authors in [71] integrate device fingerprint into a smart home for user authentication. 
However, this research does not consider continuous user authentication or behavior-based 
user authentication. The paper [122] presents a cloud-based monitoring framework to 
remotely monitoring smart homes through a surveillance camera; however, the solution 
does not consider continuous user authentication. The research in [123] proposes a security 
framework for smart devices in a smart home environment. The focus in this framework is 
only on securing communication between home devices; however, the presented solution 
does not consider user authentication. As can be observed from the potential solutions put 
forward by previous studies, most of the presented solutions are mainly designed for 
authenticating users on a dedicated device rather than for a remote accessing service. 
However, few studies proposed remote user authentication by utilizing a behavioral 
technique. For example, the authors in [124] suggested a new authentication framework 
that dissociates the intrusion detection system on the hosted device and enables the 
transparent movement of mechanisms between the host to the trusted server and vice versa. 
The proposed architecture can enable anomaly-based detection to be directly applied to the 
hosted device, or simultaneously to both the host and the cloud. 
A review of the relevant literature reveals that access behavior has been used in many 
technologies, especially at the client-side, for continuous authentication to protect against 
unauthorized access to mobile phones. Hence, app access patterns can be utilized to support 
smart home security in the form of continuous user authentication and identification at the 
server-side, the smart home central hub [125]. This concept is based on minimizing the 
load of the host device and offloading computation on the cloud. One advantage of this 
solution is that it will support multi-user behavioral models at the server-side, which 
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reduces resource consumption on mobile devices. This solution could be hosted either 
locally on the home hub or in the cloud; however, processing user profiles on the home 
smart hub offers advantages, including:  
• Protecting user’s information if the user’s device is lost or stolen [126]; 
• Avoiding battery drain on the mobile device during preprocessing and training the 
model;  
• Removing the need to rebuild the model in case the user changes mobile devices. 
 
2.6 Machine Learning Techniques for Behavioral-Based User Authentication 
Behavioral-based authentication encompasses data collection, feature extraction and 
classification. This process of utilizing machine learning techniques aims to 
extract/generate features that are related to the user and, in turn, utilize these features for 
authentication measures. An important step involves choosing a suitable classification 
approach to achieve the best accuracy [127]. Generally, machine learning techniques are 
classified into three types: supervised learning, unsupervised learning, and semi-supervised 
learning.  
2.6.1 Supervised Learning 
Supervised learning, which is one of the most popular machine learning techniques, is used 
when that dataset is labelled. Moreover, the supervised learning classification function 
maps the input to output labels or, in the regression function, maps the input to continuous 
output [127]. 
• Classification: Predictive models can be built using classification algorithms based on a 
method of approximating the mapping function from input features to discrete output 
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features. It is important to note that classification algorithms will be used when the 
desired output is a discrete label [128]. 
• Regression: Predictive models can be built using regression algorithms based on a 
method of approximating the mapping function from input features to a continuous 
output feature. A regression task is used to predict continuous outputs [128]. 
The following points summarize the widely used supervised learning classifiers: 
• Random Forest (RF): The RF  is an ensemble learning method that operates by 
constructing a multitude of decision trees at the training stage. Consequently, a 
Random Forest for each Decision Tree is built by randomly sampling a featured subset. 
The correlation between trees is reduced by randomly selecting features that improve 
the prediction power, resulting in higher efficiency. Random Forest classification 
algorithm offers advantages over other algorithms such as KNN, Naïve Bayes, Logistic 
Regression, and SVM. Some of these advantages include: overcoming the problem of 
overfitting; being less sensitive to outliers in training data; measuring the importance 
of every feature during model training [129]; rapidly performing out-of-sample 
predictions; providing accurate predictions on many types of applications [130]. 
Utilizing the Random Forest most often prevents overfitting, by creating random 
subsets of the features and building smaller trees using these subsets.  
• Support Vector Machine (SVM): The SVM, which is a classification algorithm that can 
be utilized for regression and classification tasks, has been increasingly used to solve 
classification problems. The SVM classifier has been defined by separating a 
hyperplane from training samples [131]. The SVM is applied to the generated 
extraction vectors to produce an optimal hyperplane that categorizes new examples 
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based on given training data that will help separate two classes. Based on the maximum 
size of the margin, an optimized hyperplane can distinguish the class from other classes 
[128].  
• Naïve Bayes (NB): The NB is a probabilistic classifier that has been implemented based 
on the Bayes’ Theorem rules with independence assumptions between predictors. An 
NB algorithm assumes that the presence of a specific attribute of a class is unrelated to 
the presence of any other attribute. It is important to mention that all of these attributes 
independently contribute to the classification prediction, even if these attributes depend 
on each other or upon the existence of the other attributes. The NB classifier is easy to 
compute and build, as well as highly useful for handling very large datasets [128]. 
• K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN): As one of the classification algorithms, the KNN can be 
used as a supervised learning approach. The input of the KNN is a set of label 
showcases, whereby the labels are utilized for training the supervised classifier. The 
nearest neighbor computes the minimum Euclidean distance between the points. The 
KNN can label a new point by finding the nearest neighbors to that new point, hence 
giving greater weight to closer neighbors were the K is the number of neighbors. Based 
on past data, and labelling all observations, the KNN algorithm can identify a new data 
entry using the majority class according to the nearest neighbor [132].  
2.7 Discussion 
The focus of most of the listed studies is on the client-side; from activities on the mobile 
device, the built profile detects illegal usage of the device from the modeled user profile. 
As discussed in [104], a touch screen authentication mechanism needs constant user 
interaction to be continuously authenticated. Many of the proposed solutions, such as those 
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presented in [20][21][22][23] and [24], require a particular series of actions from the user 
for authentication, including gesture recognition approaches which, in turn, eliminates the 
transparency of continuous authentication. Even though the achieved accuracy in other 
presented mechanisms is reasonable, such as demonstrated in [95], the used datasets were 
generated by users repeating a limited set of pre-defined activities for training, and usually 
only for short term usage. Additionally, it is clear from the related work that the home 
network authentication process still mainly relies on knowledge-based authentication 
approaches, as mentioned in [133][134][135]. The increasing number of apps that become 
available in the market at an almost daily rate provides users with the opportunity to install 
a variety of additional apps on their end-devices. Accordingly, it can be concluded that 
behavior profiling, especially app-based profiling, for the purpose of verifying the current 
user of an end-device, should be considered for continuous authentication.  
For protecting user information during transmission among home IoT devices, many 
lightweight security schemes, such as in [62][63][66], have been proposed based on 
symmetric cryptography. These schemes involve sharing a number of symmetric keys for 
each party and, if the shared key is compromised, especially when PFS is not utilized, all 
communicated messages will be realized. For providing a higher level of security, public-
key cryptography has been used. However, public-key cryptography still needs a certificate 
for each public key [26], which is considered a complex process, in addition to the 
involvement of a third party. Hence, any new proposed security scheme should satisfy the 
following requirements:  
• any cryptographic solution should be less computationally intensive so as to be able to 
run on devices with limited capabilities;  
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• any involved device should be able to authenticate any transmitted message without 
involving a third party in each transaction and have the ability to protect against 
possible attacks.  
There are many proposed public cryptographic mechanisms that can be adopted to secure 
communication between smart home IoT devices; however, not all of them efficiently 
satisfy all the security goals. Signcryption is a mechanism that provides digital signatures 
and encryption, at the same time satisfying both authentication and integrity which, in turn, 
enables its adoption for smart home devices. In addition, the IBE [136] can satisfy the 
security requirements in IoT device communication.   
The consideration of continuous user authentication beyond the point-of-entry is crucial 
and should be considered as part of authentication. However, according to the literature, 
only a few studies employ app profiling for continuous user authentication. Although the 
achieved results in such studies are prominent, the range of apps used in the evaluation was 
restricted due to the limitations of the datasets. In addition, these studies, as in [25], focus 
on app-specific information, such as SMSs and calling behavior, for detecting abnormal 
usage in the mobile environment. With the increased number of apps replacing text 
messages and calling functions, these two features will no longer provide sufficient 
evidence of a legitimate user. Furthermore, considering that unauthorized users tend to 
operate inconspicuously, these features will provide insufficient evidence of the user. The 
focus of the earliest studies was mainly on detecting misuse behavior during interaction 
with the mobile network, such as calling and messaging services. However, none of the 
related works have utilized app access patterns on mobile devices for user authentication 




As seen in the literature, access behavior has been used in many technologies, especially 
at the client-side, for implicit user authentication to protect against unauthorized access to 
mobile phones. Hence, app access patterns can be utilized to support smart home security 
in the form of background user authentication at the server-side, namely the smart home 
central hub. Furthermore, a detailed review of the works listed in the related literature 
suggests that multi-user authentication has not received enough attention. Therefore, to 
increase the trust of homeowners, it is very important to consider these issues in presenting 
a robust user authentication approach for smart home networks. Moreover, it is clear from 
the literature that the point-of-entry authentication approach has been developed in order 
to determine permission to access the device itself and that it provides no further protection 
during the usage session. However, in reality, the need for security will vary depending 
upon what the user is doing, and different services and data should require different levels 
of security. As a result, an advanced authentication approach, which is capable of 
continuously monitoring and authenticating a user based upon the user’s legitimacy, is 
needed. This can be achieved by using an implicit authentication mechanism. 
Consequently, users will not be aware that authentication is taking place, avoiding the need 
to stop operation, for example, in order to re-enter a PIN.  
Many proposed signcryption schemes that are based on RSA cannot efficiently provide all 
the security goals. However, a suitable cryptographic technique that could solve security 
issues in device communication for smart homes is the IBS. A detailed review of the current 
literature suggests that no signcryption scheme has yet been proposed for securing smart 
home communications, which is the primary focus of this thesis. Additionally, none of the 
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related works have utilized app access patterns on mobile devices for user authentication 
for smart home networks. This thesis solves the aforementioned issues by proposing a 
contextual authentication framework that considers device authentication utilizing IBE as 




Chapter 3. Proposed Solution 
This chapter presents a contextual authentication framework for smart home environments. 
This framework consists of three main parts: the context-based user authentication method, 
device-to-device message authentication, and app-based user authentication model. The 
first part is a context-based authentication method that utilizes contextual information to 
verify the current user who is trying to access smart home IoT devices from his/her 
registered end-device (smartphone/tablet). The second part is a device-to-device message 
authentication scheme to protect transmitted messages among smart home IoT devices. The 
third part is a user authentication model that builds a user profile based on previous apps’ 
access history in order to make the right decision at the login stage, at subsequent access 
requests regarding authorized user access and during the access sessions. This framework 
can be adopted in different IoT applications, such as the smart home, smart medical care 
[137], smart agriculture, smart grid and smart environmental protection [138][139]. This 
chapter presents a detailed description of the proposed framework, a contextual 
information taxonomy and collection, a context-based user authentication method, a 
device-to-device message authentication scheme, and an app-based user authentication 
model.  
3.1 Assumptions and Threat Model 
The scope of this research is restricted to the user and device-to-device message 
authentication for smart homes. The main goal of the proposed framework is to protect 
against unauthorized access while permitting implicit authentication to authorized users. In 
addition, it provides secure communication between smart home IoT devices. The 
presented framework in this thesis is subject to the following assumptions:  
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• Registered users, mobile devices, and the added trusted server (TS) are assumed to be 
trusted. After registration, there is an app-based authentication model building and 
training stage, during which and authentication will be provided by other means. 
Additionally, every user has one profile and one assigned account in the home network. 
• The home network is protected against outsider unauthorized access, meaning that 
unregistered devices are unable to communicate with the home network without 
passing the registration stage.  
• All mobile devices/tablets are uniquely identified; the operating systems as well as 
installed apps, including the smart home user interface, are secure.  In addition, the 
registration of the device, including end-user device and home IoT devices, is achieved 
through a local channel directly between the home devices, the mobile device and the 
trusted server. 
• The home gateway (HG), the main connection point between the smart home IoT 
devices, the TS and the Internet, is assumed to be vulnerable to attacks. Thus, any 
transmitted message could be exploited by an adversary residing in the HG, which 
could disclose user information. 
The proposed framework aims to protect against threat scenarios for both user 
authentication and device authentication. Accessing the smart home network and 
controlling home appliances is mainly achieved through registered mobile devices by 
known users. However, access permissions can be given to other users, such as visitors and 
friends, who will be able to access the home network using their mobile devices. 
Accordingly, for user authentication, there are security points where unauthorized access 
to the home networks could occur:  
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• The user is logged into the mobile device, and the device is left unattended immediately 
after the login stage, yet it is being used by unauthorized users (insiders). An insider, 
as mentioned in [140], can be a visitor or another registered user and familiar with other 
users.  
• The mobile device, on which user’s device login credentials are stolen, compromised, 
or given, is lost or stolen by unknown users (outsiders, strangers [39]), causing these 
devices to be vulnerable to unauthorized access and usage.  
• Thus, at any access request, the authentication process will result in three possibilities: 
o Registered user request access from his/her registered mobile device;  
o Registered user request access from another registered mobile device (insider); 
o Unregistered user request access from a registered mobile device (outsider). 
Transmitted messages between home IoT devices could be exploited by an adversary 
residing in the HG. Consequently, message authentication should be performed by each 
entity involved in a smart home network to verify the source of any issued message. Hence, 
the following scenarios are examples of possible threats include: 
• An adversary residing in a HG might launch an active attack [141] to target data 
integrity, such as modifying or altering a command during its transmission.  
• An adversary might also, as a result of being able to eavesdrop on a message 
transmission, discover a command message. For example, if an attacker is able to reach 
a message command sent to a lightening system to turn the light on or, an adversary 
would know whether the user is at home, which could result in the home being broken 
into, impacting confidentiality. Thus, any important information involved in the 
transmitted messages among devices must be inaccessible to unauthorized parties.  
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3.2 Framework Architecture 
The architecture of the proposed framework consists of user authentication mechanisms as 
well as data protection mechanism, as depicted in Figure 3.1. In this thesis, we consider a 
smart home system model which consists of four main parties: a number of home devices; 
an end-user device; a home gateway; and a trusted server (TS). The end-user device, which 
could be any smart device such as a smartphone or a tablet, is used as a node in the smart 
home model. Furthermore, we consider the communication process as any message 
exchanged between home devices. 
  
Figure 3.1. A contextual authentication framework for smart home environments 
In the proposed framework, different contextual attributes and properties can be utilized to 
enhance the determination of a legitimate user. This can be achieved by capturing long-
term contextual information (e.g., app access patterns, power consumption); short-term 
contextual information (e.g., location, profile); and sensor data (e.g., pressure, 
temperature). Additionally, it is important that the collected contextual information is 
transmitted to and stored securely on the TS, and has backup storage, an external hard disk 
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drive, in case of data loss, so models and profiles do not need to be retrained. The data is 
protected in transit between the end-user devices and the TS through the use of HTTPS 
encryption. Also, data transit between the TS and the home IoT devices is protected through 
the IBS scheme and the data is stored in an encrypted form. The terminology used in the 
rest of this thesis as well as the major components upon which the framework is built are 
as follows: 
• Home Devices: Home devices are any devices (e.g., surveillance camera, media server, 
smart lock, refrigerator, or baby monitor) that can be remotely accessed. Most of these 
devices communicate locally over wireless channels through the local home gateway. 
• End-User Devices: End-user devices are any devices (e.g., smartphone or tablet) that 
can be used to access home devices, through an application programming interface 
(API) installed during the registration stage. This API can collect usage data and send 
it to the home TS for user behavior analysis. Every access request or command will be 
accompanied with context information measurements for user pattern analysis and 
evaluation.  
• Home Gateway (HG): The home gateway is a network entity (router) that acts as an 
intermediary between home devices and end-user devices. The primary role of the HG 
is to help in exchanging messages locally among devices through either the WiFi or the 
Internet. 
• Trusted Server (TS): We integrate a trusted server that is responsible for initializing the 
system, registering user, building usage pattern profiles, and registering new devices 
and assigning required secret communication parameters. The TS contains a database 
that records all the registered devices and the access log history of users as well as 
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performing user access patterns modeling. It is responsible for the authentication 
process and protects access to these devices. The TS collects the required contextual 
information and determines whether the access request satisfies the predefined 
requirement.  
 
3.2.1 Contextual Information 
Table 3.1 shows what contextual information would be available and how it would be 
collected. The vast majority of these contextual attributes could be used when the user is 
accessing the system remotely, with some environmental information able to be collected 
with trusted sensors installed at a remote location including, for example, by using a 
Bluetooth module to check if the user’s device is nearby. Some of the contextual 
information can be collected and maintained solely by the TS and normal responses from 
user devices, while others would require extra data from the user’s device itself. Lastly, 
while most of this data can be collected in the background, some other contextual 
information, such as the user’s profile information, security questions [142], and calendar, 
would require specific interaction with the system. 
3.2.2 Device-to-Device Message Authentication 
From the initial connection of devices in a smart home network, the following security 
requirements should be satisfied in order to prevent attacks: 
• Authentication: Authentication should take place for any transmitted message to verify 
its source. The system can then prevent any unauthorized access to devices. 
• Integrity: Integrity ensures that a transmitted message is not altered or generated by an 
attacker during its transmission. 
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• Confidentiality: Confidentiality should be satisfied to protect any disclosure of the 
transmitted messages among devices which may contain sensitive information that 
could be exploited by an adversary. Protecting any disclosure of the information related 
to home devices would also prevent users’ information being revealed.   
• The proposed scheme should be lightweight, meaning lower cost in regard to 
computation time and cipher-text length. 
3.2.3 User Authentication 
The presented approach aims authenticating users with low FPRs and FNRs; utilizing 
implicit features that can be extracted, without requiring user intervention in the 
authentication process; ensuring that the utilized features are generalized, hence can be 
extracted from most mobile devices regardless of the operating systems on these devices 
or the type of hardware; and protecting collected information on mobile devices during 
transmission and at the TS end. However, there are a number of challenges that need to be 
overcome in order to achieve the presented goals. These challenges, which are considered 
in the design process, include: transforming the app access events in the form of 
observations that include timing transition information; building (training and testing) the 
model in a way that considers imbalances in the users’ observations; utilizing a low number 
of events, hence reducing the time factor, in the authentication and identification of users; 
and adapting the change in user patterns, including new added apps. This study examines 
the available contextual information in regard to the permission requirements and retrieval 
time to be used for authentication. Finally, it provides user authentication by checking 
contextual information in real-time during the access session without user intervention 
unless the situation requires it. 
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Table 3.1. Contextual information 













Location Device Yes No No 
Access patterns 
(logs) 
TS Yes No No 
Profile Device Yes No Yes 




TS Possible No No 
Operating 
System 
TS Yes No No 
Browser TS Yes No No 
Voltage value Device Yes Yes No 
Wi-Fi access 
points 
Device Yes Yes No 
Used 
applications 
Device Yes Yes No 
Battery level Device Yes Yes No 
MAC address TS Yes No No 
Motion 
detection 
Device Yes Yes No 
Rotation 
detection 




Device Yes Yes No 
Network 
Context 
IP address TS Yes No No 
Connection 
type 
Device Yes Yes No 
Ping TS Yes No No 
Speed Device Yes Yes No 
Traceroute TS Yes No No 
Environmental 
Context 
Lighting Device Possible Yes No 
Temperature Both Possible Yes No 
Pressure Both Possible Yes No 
Humidity Both Possible Yes No 
Loudness Device Possible Yes No 
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3.3 Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme  
This section presents an Identity-Based Signcryption scheme (IBS) for device-to-device 
message authentication in smart homes. This section first presents the preliminaries that 
are used in this thesis, and then, it gives an overview of the proposed scheme, which 
consists of five phases: system initialization, registration, signcryption, unsigncryption and 
correctness. 
3.3.1 Preliminaries 
This section presents some preliminaries that are used in this thesis. Table 3.2 shows the 
used notations throughout the thesis. 
3.3.1.1 Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
This subsection presents elementary concepts, including the group theory and elliptic 
curve groups.  
An abelian group (G1,∗) consists of a set G1 with a binary operation ∗ : G1 x G1 → G1 
satisfying the following properties [143]:  
• Associativity: a ∗ (b ∗ c) = (a ∗ b) ∗ c for all a, b, c ∈ G1. 
• Existence of an identity: There exists an element e ∈ G1 such that a ∗e =e∗a =a for 
all a ∈ G1. 
• Existence of inverses: For each a ∈ G1, there exists an element b ∈ G1, called the 
inverse of a, such that a ∗ b = b ∗ a = e. 
• Commutativity: a ∗ b = b ∗ a for all a, b ∈ G1. 
The additive group, the (additive) identity element, is usually denoted by 0, and the 
(additive) inverse of a is denoted by (-a). The point addition operation is performed by 
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drawing a line through two points (e.g., P, Q), and this line will intersect the curve E at one 
more point R. Then by drawing a line parallel to the y-axis through point R, the line will 
intersect the curve E at the new point R=P+Q. The inverse of a point P= (x, y) on the curve 
E is the point mirrored at the x-axis in -P= (-x, y). If the point is the same P at the additive 
operation, the tangent on the curve at the point P (P+P=2P) is known as point doubling.  
The multiplicative group, the (multiplicative) identity element, is usually denoted by 1, and 
the (multiplicative) inverse of a is denoted by (𝑎−1). The group is finite if G1 is a finite 
set, in which case the number of elements in G1 is called the order of G1. If p is a prime 
number, and 𝑍𝑝 ={0,1,2, . . ., p-1} denotes the set of integers modulo p, then (𝑍𝑝,+), where 
the operation + is defined as the addition of integers modulo p, is a finite additive group of 
order p with (additive) identity element 0. Additionally, (𝑍𝑝
∗ , ·), where 𝑍𝑝
∗= {1,2, . . ., p-1} 
denotes the nonzero elements in 𝑍𝑝 and the operation (·) is defined as multiplication of 
integers modulo p.  𝑍𝑝
∗  is a finite multiplicative group of order p-1 with (multiplicative) 
identity element 1 [143]. For example, p is a prime number and 𝑍𝑝 denotes the field of 
integers modulo p. An elliptic curve E over 𝑍𝑝 is defined by an equation of the form  
𝑦2=𝑥3+ax+b                                          (3.1)                      
where a, b ∈ 𝑍𝑝 satisfy 4𝑎
3 +27𝑏2  0 (mod p). A pair (x, y), where x, y ∈ 𝑍𝑝, is a point 
on the curve if (x, y) satisfies the equation (3.1) defining the curve E. The point at infinity, 
denoted by ∞, is also said to be on the curve. The set of all the points on E is denoted by 
E(𝑍𝑝) [143]. For example, if E is an elliptic curve over 𝑍7  with defining equation  
𝑦2=𝑥3+2x+4b                                        (3.2) 
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then the points on E are E (𝑍7) = {∞, (0,2), (0,5), (1,0), (2,3), (2,4), (3,3), (3,4), (6,1), 
(6,6)}. The nonzero elements of a finite field 𝑍𝑝 , denoted 𝑍𝑝
∗  , form a cyclic group under 
multiplication. Hence there exist elements b ∈ 𝑍𝑝
∗  called generators such that  
𝑍𝑝
∗= {𝑏𝑖 : 0 ≤ i ≤ p −2}                            (3.3) 
The order of a ∊ 𝑍𝑝
∗  is the smallest positive integer i such that 𝑎𝑖 = 1. As 𝑍𝑝
∗  is a cyclic 
group, it follows that i is a divisor of p −1. 
3.3.1.2 Bilinear Pairing on Elliptic Curves 
Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of order p for some large prime p, and 𝑃1  G1 be the 
generator of G1. The IBE makes use of a bilinear pairing map ê: G1 x G1→ G2 between 
these two cyclic groups. A bilinear parameter generator gen is a probabilistic algorithm 
that takes a security parameter sp as input, and outputs the parameters (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, ê) 
where p is a k-bit prime number. The map must satisfy the following properties [144]: 
• Bilinear: ê (aP1, bQ) = ê(𝑃1, Q)
𝑎𝑏 for all 𝑃1, Q  G1 and all a, b  𝑍𝑝
∗ . 
• Nondegenerate: If 𝑃1  is a generator of G1, then ê (𝑃1,𝑃1) is a generator of G2, thus 
ê (𝑃1,𝑃1) ≠ 1. 
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute ê (𝑃1, Q) for all  𝑃1, Q  
G1. 
A bilinear map that satisfies the properties above is said to be an admissible bilinear pairing 
map ê: G1 x G1 → G2. The Weil pairing or Tate pairing can be used to construct an 




Table 3.2. Definitions of notations 
Notation Definition 
TS trusted server 
HG Home Gateway (router) 
𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑆 identity of the TS 
𝑄𝑇𝑆 public identity of the TS 
𝑆𝑇𝑆 private key of the TS 
𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑖 identity of device i 
𝑄𝑑𝑖 public identity of device i 
𝑆𝑑𝑖 private key of a device i 
sp security parameter 
s master secret key of the TS: s 𝑍𝑝
∗  
p k bit prime number 
ê admissible bilinear parameter 
𝐻1,  𝐻2 secure cryptographic hash functions 
𝑍𝑝
∗  set of elements {1, ...., p − 1} 
𝑃1 the generator of G1 
G1 a subgroup of additive group of points 
G2 a subgroup of multiplicative group of points 
𝑟𝑖 a random integer: 𝑟𝑖  𝑍𝑝
∗  
m (message) plaintext 
n plaintext length 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 cipher-text 
σ the signcrypted message 





3.3.1.3 Complexity Assumptions 
The proposed scheme is based on two Diffie-Hellman problems as presented below. 
• Assumption 1: (Computational Diffie-Hellman problem (CDH)). Given the elements 
(𝑃1, a𝑃1, b𝑃1)  G1 for unknown a, b 𝑍𝑝
∗ , there is no polynomial time to compute 
ab𝑃1  G1. 
• Assumption 2: (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem (BDH)). Given the elements (𝑃1, a𝑃1, 
b𝑃1, c𝑃1)  G1 for unknown a, b, c  𝑍𝑝
∗ , it is difficult to compute ê(𝑃1, 𝑃1)
𝑎𝑏𝑐  G2.  
3.3.1.4 Identity-Based Signcryption (IBS) 
IBS includes four steps: system initialization, registration, signcryption and 
unsigncryption. The function of each step is outlined below. 
• System initialization: The TS uses a security parameter sp to generate the public system 
parameters while keeping sp parameter secret.  
• Registration and private key generation: Given an identity of a device 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑, the TS 
computes the corresponding private key 𝑆𝑑𝑖 and sends it back to the device. 
• Signcryption: To send a message m to a receiver with identity 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑, the sender encrypts 
the message m and then signs it consecutively using the public parameters resulting 
from the system initialization stage, and the private key 𝑆𝑑𝑖 of the sender and 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑 of 
the receiver, and the message m producing a cipher-text message. 
• Unsigncryption: When the receiver receives the cipher-text message from the sender 
device 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑, it unsigncrypts it (using the sender’s 𝐼𝐷𝑖𝑑 , the receiver’s 𝑆𝑑𝑖) to obtain the 




3.3.2 Proposed IBS Scheme 
This section presents an overview of the proposed IBS scheme, which consists of four 
phases: system initialization, registration, signcryption, unsigncryption. The steps are 
described below. Algorithm 3.1 shows the process of scheme initialization and registration 
procedure, whereas algorithm 3.2 shows the scheme signcryption and unsigncryption 
procedure. 
 
Figure 3.2. Operations of the proposed IBS scheme 
3.3.2.1 System Initialization 
In this stage, a TS is responsible for configuring system parameters. In particular, using the 
security parameter sp as input, the TS generates the bilinear parameters (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, ê) 
by running gen(k), and chooses two secure cryptographic hash functions: 𝐻1: {0, 1}
∗ → G1 
and 𝐻2: G2 → {0, 1}




∗ , which is kept as a master secret, and then calculates 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏 = s𝑃1. The public parameters: 
(p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, n, ê, 𝐻1, 𝐻2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏) are then published by the TS. 
3.3.2.2 Registration Stage 
At this stage, as shown in Figure 3.2, each device submits its chosen identity 𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑖 to the 
TS which, in turn, generates the public identity 𝑄𝑑𝑖 and calculates the private key 𝑆𝑑𝑖 using 
the master secret key s. For the sender device, the TS calculates Qd1 = 𝐻1(𝐼𝐷𝑑1) and 𝑆𝑑1 = 
s(𝑄𝑑1), then sends the public identity and the private key to the sender device over a secure 
channel. Similarly, the second (receiver) device sends the chosen identity 𝐼𝐷𝑑2 to the TS 
and receives the public identity and the private key consecutively: 𝑄𝑑2 = 𝐻1 (𝐼𝐷𝑑2) and the 
private key is 𝑆𝑑2 = s𝑄𝑑2. The TS’s identity is 𝑄𝐿𝑆. = 𝐻1 (𝐼𝐷𝑇𝑆) and the private key is 𝑆𝑇𝑆 
= s𝑄𝑇𝑆. 
After the registration stage, there is no need for communication with the TS during the 
authentication process of any transmitted messages. Access to the TS is only required at 
the time of registration or for updating secret keys. 
3.3.2.3 Signcryption 
We assume that the sender device is 𝑑1 and the receiver device is 𝑑2. Thus, the sender 
device now has the following parameters: (𝑆𝑑1, 𝑄𝑑2, m). In order to signcrypt a message m 
 {0, 1}𝑛, the proposed signcryption technique works as follows: it encrypts the message 
and then signs it consecutively using the public parameters resulting from the initialization 
stage as well as (𝑆𝑑1, 𝑄𝑑2, m). The actions of the sender device are described below. 
Generates a random integer 𝑟𝑖  𝑍𝑝
∗  and then calculates the following: 
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C1 = 𝑟𝑖𝑃1; Qd1 & Qd2 are already initialized in the registration stage. 
k = 𝐻2(ê (𝑟𝑖Qd2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)) 
𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 = (m ⊕ k), where 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 is the cipher-text. 
H= 𝐻1 (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐) 
𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 = 𝑟𝑖𝐻 + 𝑆𝑑1, where 𝑆𝑑1 is the sender’s private key. 
Result σ = (C1, 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐, 𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛) is the signcrypted message m by the sender device 𝑆𝑑1. The σ 
is then sent to the targeted receiver, device 𝑑2. 
Algorithm 3.1: Scheme initialization and registration procedure 
INPUT: 𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑖  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑘  ▷ where IDdi is the identity of the device i and sp is the security 
parameter 
OUTPUT: the public parameters (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, n, ê, 𝐻1, 𝐻2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏, 𝑄𝑑𝑖, 𝑆𝑑𝑖, 𝑄𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝑇𝑆, s)  
▷ these parameters include bilinear parameters, two secure cryptographic hash functions, 
the public identity, the private key, The TS’s identity and private key, and a master secret 
key s. 
1. procedure ()  
2.      if (initialization stage) then 
3.               (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, ê)  run gen(sp)                       
              𝐻1: {0, 1}
∗ → G1 ▷ where 𝐻1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻2 are cryptographic hash functions 
4.               𝐻2: G2 → {0, 1}
𝑛  ▷ where n is the plain text length 
                    s  𝑍𝑝
∗     ▷ where s is a chosen the number (master secret key)  𝑍𝑝
∗  
5.               s𝑃1 calculates (𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)  
6.               return (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, n, ê, 𝐻1, 𝐻2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)   ▷ where (p, 𝑃1, G1, G2, n, ê, 𝐻1,    
              𝐻2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)  are the public parameters to be published by the TS 
7.      else (registration stage) then 
8.               TS 𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑖                           
9.               𝑄𝑑𝑖, 𝑆𝑑𝑖 , 𝑠  TS generates   
10.               𝑄𝑑𝑖, 𝑆𝑑𝑖  TS calculates 𝐻1(𝐼𝐷𝑑𝑖), s(𝑄𝑑𝑖)  
11.               𝑄𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝑇𝑆 TS’s public and private key 
12.               return (𝑄𝑑𝑖, 𝑆𝑑𝑖, 𝑄𝑇𝑆, 𝑆𝑇𝑆)      
13.      𝐞𝐧𝐝 𝐢𝐟 




Algorithm 3.2: Scheme signcryption and unsigncryption procedure 
Sender device is 𝑑1 and the receiver device is 𝑑2  
INPUT: m  {0, 1}n the message to be signcrypted 
OUTPUT: σ the signcrypted message, 𝑚′ the unsigncrypted message 
1. procedure ()  
2.      if (signcryption) then 
3.               (signcrypt a message m  {0, 1}𝑛) 
4.               𝑟𝑖  𝑍𝑝
∗       ▷ the sender device 𝑑1 generates a random integer 𝑟𝑖  𝑍𝑝
∗  
5.               𝐶1  𝑟𝑖𝑃1   ▷ 𝑄𝑑1 & 𝑄𝑑2 are already initialized in the registration stage. 
                    k  𝐻2(ê (𝑟𝑖𝑄𝑑2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏))   
6.               𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 (m ⊕ k) ▷ where 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐is the cipher-text 
7.                H 𝐻1 (𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐) 
8.                𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑟𝑖H + 𝑆𝑑1 ▷ where 𝑆𝑑1 is the sender’s private key. 
9.                σ  (𝐶1, 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐, 𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛)  ▷ where σ is the signcrypted message m by the 𝑑1 
10.                return (σ)  ▷ σ is then sent to the targeted receiver, device 𝑑2.  
11.      else (unsigncryption) then 
12.                if (ê (𝑃1, 𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛) =  ê(ℎ, 𝐶1) ê(𝑄𝑑1, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)) holds then  
                       ▷ the received message is verified 
13.                        𝑘′ 𝐻2 (ê (𝑆𝑑2, 𝐶1)) 
14.                        𝑚′   𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 ⊕ 𝑘
′ 
15.                        return (𝑚′)  ▷ where 𝑚′ is the unsigncrypted message 
16.                else 
17.                        return(reject the message) 
18.                end if 
19.      end if 
20. end procedure 
 
3.3.2.4 Unsigncryption 
After receiving the signcrypted message, 𝑑2 first verifies the received message by 
running the following equations: 
ê (𝑃1, 𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛) =  ê(h, C1) ê(Qd1, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)                                                                                  (3.4)       
If equation (3.4) holds, the next step is unsigncryption, meaning that the received message 
m is authenticated. The unsigncryption algorithm works as follows: 
𝑘′ = 𝐻2 (ê (𝑆𝑑2, 𝐶1)) 
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𝑚′ = 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 ⊕ 𝑘
′ 
Otherwise, it is invalid, and the message will be rejected. 
3.4 App-Based User Authentication Model 
 This section presents the app-based user authentication model. The proposed model, as 
shown in Figure 3.3, authenticates users based on the user profile built from previous app 
access history, then makes the decision for subsequent access requests regarding legitimate 
user authentication and identification.  The presented model utilizes the app access patterns 
on users’ mobile devices as a second layer of authentication. The architecture of the 
presented model, as shown in Figure 3.3, works, after the registration step, by first 
collecting user access logs, extracting features, and training user access pattern to apps on 
mobile devices, then authenticating users based on the built pattern templates. After the 
user’s registration stage, the model tracks and collects app access events adopting the 
event-driven mechanism.  
Utilizing the event-driven data collection approach as compared with continuous sensor 
measurements collects only the information that will be employed to build user behavior. 
All information related to app access history is collected by an installed app on the mobile 
device and is then sent to the TS for the training, testing, authentication phases. After 
building and training the model, installed app on the mobile device will only send the 
events of the considered apps for user authentication and identification purposes [145]. 




3.4.1 App Categories 
In terms of running on mobile devices, there are two app categories: foreground apps and 
background apps. Foreground apps are those that run and are actively used by the user. In 
other words, foreground apps require continuous user interaction during the running time. 
Background apps are those that run without the necessity of user interaction. In other 
words, background apps do not need continuous user interaction during the running time. 
The usage of foreground apps provides real interaction of users with their mobile devices, 
whereas background apps offer little or no information on user interaction with mobile 
devices. Thus, the possible solution is to use those apps that continuously reflect usage 
behavior, namely foreground apps. In addition, since app usage data will be already 
available as a result of users’ usage on their mobile devices and tracking these apps, real-
time user authentication and identification can be achieved with high accuracy. Hence, 
different from previous related studies, we mainly focus on foreground apps.  
 
 




Additionally, when a foreground app goes into background mode, we neglect it and 
consider only the session time while the user is interacting with this app, thus presenting 
the user interaction behavior. 
Algorithm 3.3: App-Based User Authentication Model Building  
INPUT: Dataset 𝑫 
OUTPUT: user′s classification model 𝑪𝑴𝒊, Ɐ is the extracted and assigned threshold 
1. procedure ()    
2.  input  𝑫 
3.     read features  {𝒇𝒙𝟏, …., 𝒇𝒙𝒏}: features of access time (𝑫
𝒕𝒊𝒎𝒆) & network traffic      
    (𝑫𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒇𝒇) 
4.     𝑨𝒑𝒑𝒆𝒗
𝒇𝒈𝒓
  select only foreground-based events & normalize features 
5.             for user (𝒖𝒊)  1 to N do      ▷ where N is the number of users 
6.              do { 
7.                           𝑫𝒊
𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑𝒍𝒆
  1 to n do    ▷ where n is the number of samples 
8.                       extract new features  {𝒇𝟏, …., 𝒇𝒛}  
                                          ▷ where z is the number of features to be extracted 
9.                       split 𝑫 into 𝑫𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏 and 𝑫𝒊
𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕  
10.                       randomly split 𝑫𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏 into k subsets {𝑫𝟏, …𝑫𝒌} ▷ where k is number  
                          of folds                        
11.                           up-sample the 𝑫𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏 of the minority class ( 𝑫𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝒖𝒑_𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑
)  
12.                       build the model (𝑴𝒊) using both 𝑫𝒎𝒊𝒏
𝒖𝒑_𝒔𝒂𝒎𝒑
and majority Class 𝑫𝒎𝒂𝒋   
13.                           test the 𝑴𝒊 on 𝑫𝒊
𝒕𝒆𝒔𝒕 
14.                           calculate FPR, FNR and EER ▷ where FPR is false positive rate,       
                          FNR is the false negative rate, and EER is the equal error rate 
15.                  } while (FPR, FNR, and EER<5%)  
16.                  Ɐ  set threshold, number of access events per app 
17.                  set the threshold for app access  Ɐ 
18.                  𝑪𝑴𝒊 launch  
19.             end for 
20. end procedure 
 
3.4.2 Data Collection 
The data collection procedure runs on mobile devices and records the actions (events) 
whenever a foreground app runs. The app collection procedure occurs during access to 
apps via mobile networks, WiFi networks or local apps that do not need access to networks 
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in order to run. The access session is defined as when the app is interactively accessed by 
the user in the foreground mode. However, when the app situation changes to background 
mode or if it is closed, this situation is considered as the end of the access session. The two 
modes of data collection procedures are the training and testing mode and the 
authentication mode.  
1) Data Collection for Model Training and Testing 
In this stage, access records (events) on the user’s mobile device are collected whenever 
the user interacts with foreground apps. The collected information includes the user ID 
(u_id), the app identifier (app_id), the app interaction timestamp (app_st), and the app end 
interaction timestamp (app_ed).  
2) Data Collection for User Authentication 
In this stage, only the information of the last n accessed apps will be collected prior to the 
home network access request and during access sessions. Hence, every time an app is 
accessed on the mobile device, the app session information is collected and saved in a first-
in-first-out (FIFO) buffer with a limit of n accessed sessions. Thus, whenever a new app is 
called, the buffer is updated with the new app while the oldest is removed from the queue. 
Hence, the collected information in the queue includes u_id, app_id, app_st, and app_ed. 
At this stage, newly accessed (added) apps are also considered. For example, if a new app 
is launched, this app will not be considered in the access decision for the next request. 





3.4.3 Data Preprocessing and Feature Extraction 
Features that can be utilized in modeling user behavior can be generally categorized as 
explicit or implicit. The former includes features that are directly reached while accessing 
the mobile device, including app name, location and timestamp. In contrast, the implicit 
features include information that can be derived from statistical operations during 
smartphone access, such as app usage sequence, distribution, category, and access duration. 
As reported in [146], implicit features are more effective in distinguishing the access 
behavior of users. Including more features will help to mitigate the problem of similarity 
in user behavior, such as having the same access pattern to specific apps. Therefore, the 
focus of this thesis is on the implicit features. Thus, the collected information will 
subsequently be preprocessed and stored at the TS.  
Feature extraction is an important step where unique features are extracted from the 
collected information. The features that can be retrieved from app access logs on mobile 
devices include app_id, u_id; app_st; app_ed; generated traffic (app_traff) while accessing 
this app. In order to build an authentication model, the literature presents approaches that 
use a specific app to discriminate between users, but our goal is to utilize features to 
authenticate users. However, there are factors that need to be considered in order to 
generate features that can enhance the classification process. The first factor is that the 
users’ routines in accessing apps usually follow regular intervals, but sometimes deviate 
due to different circumstances. For example, a user may browse an app at the same time 
every day; however, due to a change in schedule, the app may be checked late. In this case, 
duration of access would be similar as it is a routine for the user, but the access time would 
shift in time slot.  
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As a result, the app access start time might not always be consistent. Thus, the access 
duration should be given more attention. Hence, we divide the time of day into six-time 
intervals: inter_1 (>= 00:00 & < 07:00 ); inter_2 (>= 07:00 & < 10:00 ); inter_3 ( >= 10:00 
& <12:00 );  inter_4 ( >=12:00 & < 17:00 );  inter_5 ( >=17:00 & < 21:00 ); and inter_6 
(>=21:00 & < 00:00 ).  In addition, the same might occur with days of the week. Therefore, 
we divide the days of the week into three-weekday intervals: w_inter_1 (beginning of the 
week); w_inter_2 (end of the week); and w_inter_3 (weekend). Secondly, the time between 
access sessions is considered to be an important feature, which we believe will enhance 
building the usage pattern of users. The transition between apps on a mobile device can be 
in two forms: transition between the same app, and the transition between all apps (the gap 
between consecutive app access sessions). In this thesis, we consider both as we include 
all accessed apps to model user behavior. The long transition time that occurs in some cases 
is neglected in order to avoid unknown cases such as sleeping, traveling or being out of 
power.  
Hence, the transition between apps is calculated prior to each app access inactivity time 
prior to the app access session. Thus, we consider two features, named inter-app access 
time (inter_pi), and intra-app access time (intra_pi). The first feature, the inter_pi, includes 
the interval between two consecutive accesses (𝑎𝑖−1 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑖 ) to the same app on the same 
day. This interval is calculated as  𝑎𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖−1 for all apps accessed on the same day. The 
second feature, the intra_pi, includes the interval between any two consecutive general 
accesses (𝑎𝑖 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑏𝑖) to the next app on the same day. This interval is calculated as  𝑏𝑖 − 𝑎𝑖 
for all apps accessed on the same day. This feature is individually considered every day as 
user access behavior may change from day to day. However, there may be a long-time gap 
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between the last accessed app and the new access request when, for example, a user does 
not access apps or at the beginning of the day. This problem is solved by utilizing the time 
intervals during the same day. Hence, the time transition between intervals denotes the gap 
between these intervals. Both the inter-pi (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟_𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑠𝑡(𝑎𝑖) −  𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑠𝑡(𝑎𝑖−1)) 
access time and intra-pi (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎_𝑝𝑖𝑖 = 𝑎𝑝𝑝𝑠𝑡(𝑏𝑖) − 𝑎𝑝𝑝_𝑠𝑡(𝑎𝑖)) access time are generated, 
and the access events are updated with the new features.  
The other important feature that needs to be considered is the sequence order of access to 
apps. The advantage of considering sequentially accessed apps is that there is no need for 
a sample time interval, meaning that we do not need to sample the tracked accessed apps 
for each specific period such as every five minutes or even more often. Rather, the proposed 
approach requires sequentially accessed apps whenever an app is used, and this access is 
measured as event-driven access. In addition, we consider the order of access to apps in 
everyday use as well as app continuous sequence order, which will enhance discrimination 
between users. When the access log is received from a user’s mobile device, it is used to 
generate the required features at the home TS, including: session access time (app_st, and 
app_et); extracting days of the week from the time stamps (weekday and weekend names 
(week_day)); day time (day_time); app daily usage sequence order (app_sq); app 
continuous sequence order (app_cont_sq); app category (app_cat); app access duration 
(app_dur); inter-app access time (inter_pi); intra-app access time (intra_pi); as well as 
inactivity time prior to the app access session (pi). Hence, the received access log, which 
includes the u_id, the app_id, the app_st, and the app_ed, will be transferred to event 
information that includes the new generated features. Additionally, the timestamp is 
mapped into one of the six-time intervals (inter_1, inter_2, inter_3, inter_4, inter_5, and 
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inter_6) as well as one of the three weekday intervals as follows: (app_st -> inter_i, 
w_inter_i). The generated features will then be stored in raw form in the database for 
training and testing processes. The number of the required usage sessions mainly depends 
on the user’s interaction, which can be determined in a continuous manner during model 
training and testing.  
3.4.4 Classification Strategy 
An appropriate classifier will be applied to events, with the prepared features from the 
previous step. In building the complete model, for providing authentication, a binary 
classification strategy is adopted. However, many real-life classification scenarios, such as 
intrusion detection in networks, fraud detection, and health care diseases, have imbalance 
in the related data, in which the classes are not of the same values. There are different 
approaches to dealing with this problem. However, the type of data in the application 
should be taken into account when having imbalance in the data. Despite the availability 
of different techniques that deal with imbalanced data, the suggested solution might not be 
generalized to other types of applications. Moreover, the variance of the classes’ 
distribution in the same dataset impacts the classification performance.  
To deal with the class imbalance, the up-sampling (over-sampling) technique is applied to 
balance the class distribution of the data samples during the training process. Furthermore, 
as we are targeting multi-user authentication, the one-vs-rest classification [147] will be 
applied for each class, with the result that each access event will be classified as being 
related or not to one of the enrolled known users. Hence, each classifier will be trained with 
the first class (𝐶1) as the targeted class (legitimate user), and the second class (𝐶2) as the 
illegitimate user. Consequently, the classifier classifies each single event, producing a 
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probability of the related class of this event. Training and testing methodology on each 
user’s information in an incremental usage basis is applied, in which training the model 
will be applied within a specific time interval and testing the model will be applied on 
unseen data, the next usage samples. Hence, each user’s information template is created by 
training the classifier on the given information of this user as legitimate while considering 
the rest of the users as illegitimate.  
Each classifier is trained on the data of a specific user; thus we need to construct N binary 
classifiers (𝐶𝑀1, 𝐶𝑀2, 𝐶𝑀3, … 𝐶𝑀𝑁) based on the number of users. As a result, the 
authentication process requires only the computation of one classification model (𝐶𝑀𝑖) on 
the information received from the registered device from which the request is issued, and 
the user claiming to be legitimate.  
Therefore, each classification model enables the authentication of the related (assigned) 
user (𝑢𝑖). In contrast, when the events are not classified for the targeted registered user, the 
authentication process requires the computation of the N-1 classification models to classify 
the received sample information to one of the previously trained user patterns. We chose 
to utilize the RF classifier as it is widely used in many applications such as banking, 
medicine, the stock market and e-commerce.  In addition, it has evidenced high accuracy 
in previous studies [94][125][148]. The RF is a supervised classification algorithm which 
creates a forest with a number of trees. Even though other classifiers, such as the SVM, 
have been used in the literature, it requires more computation time and produces less 
accuracy. In addition, we select the parameter values for the RF that minimalize the FPR 




3.4.5 User Authentication Unit 
Our proposed method aims is to build an authentication model based on legitimate user 
access patterns. This step requires a training stage in which the user data is collected, and 
the final classification model is created. After the initial access, the model starts to monitor 
user behavior while accessing home appliances. The access logs, which are translated 
events with extracted appropriate features, are then classified as for an enrolled user or not. 
Three important aspects, as mentioned at the threat model, should be considered while 
tracking user access to smart home networks: registered user from his/her registered device 
(legitimate user); registered user from another registered device (insider), and unregistered 
user from a registered device (outsider). Hence, user authentication is defined as the 
mechanism that determines whether the provided pattern that is coming from a registered 
device of the current user belongs to a legitimate, registered user.  
In contrast, for insiders, user authentication can be defined as the mechanism that 
determines whether the provided, collected pattern belongs to one of the previously 
registered, known users. For user authentication, only one classifier will be run, whereas if 
the pattern is not classified for the registered user, N-1 classifiers will be run at the same 
time and the decision will be based on the output of these classifiers, as shown in Figure 
 








3.4. Hence, as a first step, the proposed approach performs user authentication on the 
received access logs, and when this pattern does not belong to the main owner of the end-
device, it performs the other authentication procedures in order to detect whether this user 
is one of the home members (insider) or not (outsider). If the user is classified as one of the 
known users, access permission will be given based on the permission that was set at the 
registration stage by the administrator.  
In most cases, the appearance of many unknown apps during the authentication process 
will indicate that it is not being accessed by the legitimate user, but from another user, 
either an insider or outsider. In general, unknown apps could appear in two cases: apps that 
are not part of the training set while training the model and apps that are newly launched 
by the user. The first case does not have a significant effect on the model because we utilize 
a k-fold based training, hence eliminating the chance of not including all used apps in the 
training stage. For the second case, when an event contains a new app, the decision unit 
handles it as follows: if this app is the last in the last sequence of accessed apps, it invokes 
the user for a second-factor authentication, and when it is provided by the user, the user 
will be authenticated and the model will be trained with this new app until reaching a 
specific number of interactions to this app (app_cont_sq). If it is not the last app in the last 
sequence of the accessed apps, the user can be authenticated if the last received app events 
meet the set criteria at the decision unit according to the classification probability of the 
rest of the apps in the sequence. 
3.4.6 Decision Unit 
Classifying each access event received from the user’s mobile device may include FPRs. 
Thus, to eliminate this issue, a number of events (window size [N]) should be considered 
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in determining access decisions. Consequently, we consider applying window size events 
(number of events) to determine the access decision.  Therefore, at the decision unit, the 
access decision (𝐷i) of the new request is made based on the classified events of the last 
two apps accessed, based on the formula 3.5, immediately before the access request sent 
from the user. 
𝐷i = {
𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙) ∈  𝑢𝑖 , 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
 𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1 ∈  𝑢𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑎𝑙 ∉  𝑢𝑖), 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1  ∉  𝑢𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑎𝑙 ∈  𝑢𝑖), 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1  ∉  𝑢𝑖) 𝑎𝑛𝑑 (𝑎𝑙 ∉  𝑢𝑖), 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑦 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠
                         (3.5) 
At this unit, the decision (𝐷𝑖) will be made based on the last two accessed events 
(𝑎𝑙−1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙 ). Consequently, when the last two classified events are identified for a 
specific user (𝑢𝑖), the next access request will be accepted. If the last accessed events are 
identified to the current user, the next request will be accepted; otherwise it will be denied, 
and the user will be requested to undergo a second-factor authentication in order to prove 
identity. If the last two accessed events are not classified to the legitimate user, the decision 
will be made based on the majority of the rest of the classification models, based on the 









𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙) ∈  𝑢𝑖+1, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑖+1 
𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙) ∈  𝑢𝑖+2, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑖+2 




𝑖𝑓 (𝑎𝑙−1𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑎𝑙) ∈  𝑢𝑛, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑡 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝑢𝑛 
 
                  (3.6) 
For example, if the access events were received from a user’s (𝑢𝑖) device and the related 
classification model classifies such access as not for this user, then these events will be 
passed to the other classification models to check if they belong to one of the registered 
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(known) users. If it is recognized as one of the registered users, the access can be granted 
based on the permission assigned to this user at the registration stage, based on the formula 
3.7.  
Algorithm 3.4: App-Based User Authentication Model Launching 
INPUT: 𝑒𝑣𝑖−𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑒𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎_𝑟𝑒𝑞 are the last app events, a_req is the access request, 
Ɐ is the extracted and assigned threshold from the model building step, sec_fa is the 
second-factor authentication 
OUTPUT: access request decision (grant/deny) to user (𝒖𝒊, 𝒖𝒋) 
1. procedure ()  
2.     receive  {𝑒𝑣𝑖−𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑒𝑣𝑖−1, 𝑎_𝑟𝑒𝑞} 
3.     {𝒇𝟏, …., 𝒇𝒛} Generate features set 
4.            for user (𝒖𝒊)  1 to N do     ▷ where N is the number of users 
5.          while (𝑎_𝑟𝑒𝑞 ≠0) do 
6.                  if threshold >= Ɐ then                        
7.                                     𝐶𝑀𝑖 {𝑒𝑣𝑖−𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑒𝑣𝑖−1}  
8.                       if 𝒖𝒊   {𝑒𝑣𝑖−𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑒𝑣𝑖−1} then 
9.                    access  grant 𝒖𝒊 
10.                                      else 
11.                                            (𝐶𝑀𝑗≠𝑖, 𝐶𝑀𝑖+1, … 𝐶𝑀𝑁) {𝑒𝑣𝑖−𝑛, … , 𝑒𝑣𝑖−2, 𝑒𝑣𝑖−1} 
12.                                            if 𝒖𝒋   𝐶𝑀𝑗≠𝑖 then   ▷ where 𝐶𝑀𝑗≠𝑖 is the classification  
                                                 model of another registered user 𝒖𝒋 
13.                       access grant 𝒖𝒋 
14.                                            else      
15.                                                 request  sec_fa 
16.                       if correct sec_fa  then  
17.                            𝑫𝒊
𝒕𝒓𝒂𝒊𝒏
 update (𝑒𝑣𝑖)   ▷ update the model with the  
                                                     new utilized app 
18.                            access  grant 𝒖𝒊 
19.                                                 else 
20.                                                      access  deny 𝒖𝒊 
21.                                            end if  
22.                                       end if 
23.                                 end if 
24.                         end while 
25.             end for 




The strategy here comprises the computation of N-1 models and the decision (𝐷𝑖) will then 
be made based on most of the highest probability score from the models. 
𝐷𝑘𝑢 = ∑ 𝑖𝑑𝑒_𝐹𝑢𝑛(𝑛=(𝑗≠i) 𝑀𝑗(𝑘𝑗))                                                     (3.7) 
where u is the unknown received sample, D is the decision score, n is the number of 
classification models, K is the collection of the events that need to be fed to the 
classification model, and ide_Fun is the authentication function.  
The result of the decision will be either classification as one of the known users (𝑢𝑖) or 
unknown user (𝑢𝑢𝑛).  In the third case, when the received sample is not identified to any of 
the trained users’ templates, it is considered to be an unknown (outsider) user and the access 
request will be declined. In addition, in the case of false classification of the event user and 
a second-factor authentication will be requested from the users. In the case of the second-
factor authentication is provided by the user, the model will be trained on this event. 
Algorithm 3.4 shows the process of launching the app usage pattern-based user 
authentication model. 
3.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we present a contextual authentication framework for smart homes. This 
framework considers both user authentication and device-to-device message 
authentication. In this framework, there are characteristics and features which are 
considered as fundamental properties of the framework. For example, users are not required 
to set up any security configuration but are required to provide some related information 
and preferences that will be enhanced with contextual information collected by the system 
itself. Preliminarily, at the app app-based authentication model training, the framework 
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utilizes other information in order to reduce unauthorized access until building the model. 
During this stage, users are provided access privileges that expire without the need for 
manual revocation in the case of not manually terminating the access session, especially 
during the model training and testing stage. 
App usage data is utilized to characterize user access patterns in accordance with the app 
activities of end-devices. In this technique, historical user interaction activities with the 
apps is utilized to characterize user behavior utilizing classification. Additionally, the 
presented app-based authentication model does not require specific action from the user in 
order to be authenticated, but it is based on regular actions while accessing apps, which 




Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation and Results 
 
This chapter describes the implementation of the proof of concept prototype, experimental 
evaluation results and a discussion. According to the categorization of the IoT applications 
as presented in [139], the implementation and evaluation of the proposed framework is 
based on the first category, which is the smart home scenario. Following this approach, an 
authentication mechanism for smart homes, which integrates retrieved contextual 
information in a real-time manner, is introduced. This chapter then presents a performance 
evaluation of a device-to-device message authentication scheme, followed by app-based 
user authentication model evaluation metrics and results. 
4.1 Prototype of Context-Based Authentication 
The proposed prototype architecture was implemented at the Devices, Networks and 
Architecture (DNA) Lab, as Figure 4.1 shows [149]. This section describes the contextual 
information retrieved and the authentication process based on the collected contextual 
information. 
The prototype implementation utilizes a Linksys E1200 [150] router (HG) flashed with 
DD-WRT [151]. The application then runs on a Raspberry Pi, the TS, which can control 
the router using the SSH functionality provided by the DD-WRT firmware. The HG uses 
two wireless networks: one for users and one for home IoT devices, to allow for access 
control between the two networks. The firewall blocks all access to the home IoT network 
by default, allowing only access to the Raspberry Pi (TS) (secure flask server) application, 
which controls further access. A simple port forward on the HG to the TS would allow for 




Figure 4.1. Architecture of the implemented prototype 
The application is a Python program that runs a Flask [152] web server and Paramiko [153] 
SSH session along with a MySQL database. The Flask server handles user authentication 
and provides the controls necessary to interact with the home IoT devices on the network, 
along with the administrator’s tools to add or configure new users or devices. The Paramiko 
library establishes an SSH connection to the HG, which allows the application to both 
searches for connected devices and controls their interactions. Finally, the MySQL 
database stores user’s data and devices data along with their individual configurations, rule 
sets, and logs. Table 4.1 shows the detailed specifications of some of the used devices for 
the implementation. To access any of the home IoT devices on the network, the user would 
first browse to the page where the application is hosted on the TS. This would either be a 
statically assigned IP address or hostname that could be easily bookmarked by frequent 
users or shared with other users. The user accesses the home devices via a homepage that 
allows the control of less sensitive devices and hide or deny control of more sensitive 
devices. Each user would also be able to have an associated calendar to determine when 
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access to devices should be allowed. For this prototype [154], integration with a user’s 
Google Calendar was used, along with a cached copy in the database. This allows both 
users to determine times when they will be away from home and therefore not accessing 
certain devices, as well as enables the homeowner to determine times to explicitly permit 
or deny access to certain devices by a user. 
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New devices can be added to the system by connecting them to the wireless network 
intended for the device, and then going to the respective page. Devices are listed on the 
page based on the router’s ARP table, acquired through SSH, and cross-referenced against 
the database to determine if they have already been added and configured. In addition to 
being able to set their name, description, and static IP, used devices can be set to only allow 
access from certain user accounts or be set to ignore location authentication if they are in 
a fixed location. Home IoT devices can also be configured to only permit access to certain 
users, along with many options, such as allowing external access, anonymous access, 
requiring location authentication, or restricting usage to certain devices or schedules. All 
actions by users are logged in the database against the device origin and the user credentials 
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if logged in. This includes actions such as arriving or departing a location, accessing the 
site or devices, and logging in or out of the site. Some of the contextual information can be 
collected and maintained solely by the TS and normal responses from the user end-devices, 
while others would require extra data from the user’s end-device itself. This is achieved 
through the use of an app installed on the end-users' devices as a background service, such 
as an Android app on the Google Nexus tablet or Samsung Galaxy Note 4 phone used in 
the DNA lab [155]. Because of susceptibility to loss or theft, no information related to users 
is stored on the devices. This ensures that if the device is compromised, the adversary 
cannot learn the user profile and simulate the user’s behavior to gain system access. All 
data is replicated to a backup location to avoid both data loss and the need to retrain user 
profiles, thus preventing a malicious user from rebuilding a user’s profile to match their 
own contexts.  
4.1.1 Context-Based User Authentication  
In evaluating the effectiveness of the implemented prototype in regard to context-based 
user authentication, we have used the following criteria:  
• The overhead (time/ms) imposed on the system by each added attribute used in the 
authentication process 
• The authentication-assigned weights and thresholds set by the administrator and their 
effects on access decision-making 
• The ability for the TS to handle multiple simultaneous requests without bottlenecking 
access to smart devices 
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4.1.2 Performance  
This part of the evaluation examines the time (ms) imposed on the system by each added 
authentication parameter in the authentication processes shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. 
Table 4.2. Performance of individual authentication methods 




No authentication 7 90 
IP address-based location (network) 8 90 
Bluetooth-based location (proximity) 14 97 
knowledge-based credentials (username, 
password) 
15 96 
Calendar access 13 96 
 
Table 4.3. Performance of authentication methods combined 
Used Parameter Local Access 
Time (ms) 
Internet Access  
Time (ms) 
No authentication 7 90 
Location based on both IP address and Bluetooth 14 90 
Location based on both IP address and 
Bluetooth, and knowledge-based credentials 
(username, password) 
16 98 
Location based on both IP address and 
Bluetooth, knowledge-based credentials 
(username, password), and calendar access 
20 98 
 
The above tables demonstrate our performance tests on all the authentication methods, both 
individually selected contextual attributes and combined attributes. Both the location based 
on the IP address and the user’s session cookie, granted by user credentials, are retrieved 
77 
 
from the user’s request itself. Nearby Bluetooth devices are retrieved from the cache, and 
the current time is compared against events in the user’s calendar in the database. As 
expected, no authentication yields the fastest results, with a combination of all methods 
being the slowest. However, as can be seen in Tables 4.2 and 4.3, there is very little 
overhead on the request-level associated with the different authentication methods. While 
location, calendar access, and even knowledge-based credentials most affect the response 
times, the difference is almost negligible, especially when accessing the system over the 
Internet. 
4.1.3 Authentication Weights and Device Thresholds  
For the second experiment, the system framework is evaluated with regards to the 
calculated confidence levels, based on the assigned weights and the subsequent access 
levels given to the various services. As mentioned in the design goals, the framework will 
utilize contextual information parameters to enhance the knowledge-based credentials to 
authenticate the user. Hence, as a preliminary step, users will be authenticated based on the 
overall available parameters and the average re-check interval. The re-check interval is set 
to one minute as an initial value, and this time is then updated based on the average of the 
previous access sessions of the user. For example, if the average of the previous access 
sessions is 10 minutes, then the frequency of re-checking the context information would be 
one-third of this time. When any of the authentication requirements do not meet predefined 
roles (the predefined confidence levels, as shown in Table 4.4, are the minimum threshold 
for accessing the required device), the access session will be automatically revoked. This 
quality is calculated with assigned weights to each included authentication parameter, for 
example: location weight = 20%, calendar schedule data weight = 20%, time = 10%, 
78 
 
username and password = 30%, and profile data (such as preferences) = 20%. Smart 
devices are set up with a required confidence level needed to access their services. If in the 
event that confidence level is too low to access a service, the user will be requested to enter 
a second-factor authentication, such as security questions/preferences, or try again when 
scheduled or no longer attempting to access remotely, depending on what attributes are 
lacking.  
Table 4.4 shows some example weights for contexts that are assigned by default, and 
security levels that are assigned by the administrator which will be applied to smart devices 
of varying concern. The confidence level is considered as the total of the assigned weight 
of the available contextual information. As seen in Table 4.4 (A), when providing both 
knowledge-based credentials of username and password, the assigned weight is 40 
whereas, when achieving access to only the calendar, the assigned weight is only 10. In 
contrast, as seen in Table 4.4 (B), the highest security level is 4 with threshold 100, whereas 
the lowest security level is 1 with threshold 30.  
Table 4.4. Example of authentication weights for context parameters and 
threshold for accessing devices 
(A)  (B) 
Available Parameters Assigned 
Weight/100 
 User Security Level Access 
Threshold/100 
Username & Password 40 4 100 
Location (proximity) 30 3 70 
Location (network) 20 2 50 




Table 4.5 reflects some examples of calculating a confidence level by adding together the 
assigned weights and determining if the system should grant the user access to the 
requested service. As can be seen from the same table, should the confidence level 
(calculated by combining the available parameter weights) be sufficient to meet the security 
level/access threshold of the requested service, access is granted.  














































Username, Password 40 40  1 4 Denied 
Bluetooth 20 20 1 2 Denied 
Scheduled, Bluetooth 
and on local network  
10, 30, 20  60  2 2 Granted 
Scheduled, Bluetooth 
and on local network 
10, 30, 20  60  2 1 Granted 
 
If the calculated confidence level is insufficient to meet the security level/access threshold 
of the requested service, access will be denied. As an example, as seen in Table 4.5, with 
the ability to access calendar information as well as the location based on the network, the 
total calculated weight will be 30. Thus, if the user is requesting access to a service with 
an assigned security level of 3 or higher, the request will be denied, since the achieved 
security level is lower than that required. In addition, having only a username and password 
would allow login and access to only those services that do not require a high threshold. 




4.1.4 Scalability  
In this section, the TS is tested for its ability to handle multiple simultaneous requests to 
access to the home network. This evaluation demonstrates that the implemented prototype 
is able to handle several simultaneous requests simulated by Apache JMeter, without 
significantly affecting response times. As shown in Figure 4.2, the implemented prototype 
is able to handle several simultaneous requests without significantly affecting the response 
times from our previous trials. 
 
Figure 4.2. Snapshot of Apache JMeter multiple simultaneous requests 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Historical data captured by the TS 
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As shown in Figure 4.3, the implemented prototype stores all historical information that is 
related to users interacting in any way with the system or various services. This includes, 
but is not limited to, user logins (both successful and failed), accessed services (both 
permitted and denied), and new registrations. 
4.1.5 Comparison with Related Work 
Although we did not find a similar prototype at the time to compare the results with, we 
compare the presented approach with the related work regarding the utilized contextual 
parameters. Table 2.1 provides a comparison of some relevant related works regarding 
utilized information, advantages, and limitations. From the comparison, the presented 
context-based authentication in this thesis differs from the aforementioned solutions in 
several ways. It not only depends on one parameter but also on available contextual 
information such as location based on both IP address and Bluetooth, calendar and profile. 
Additionally, it provides authentication by checking contextual information in real-time 
during the access session without user intervention. 
4.2 Evaluation of Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme   
This section provides an evaluation of the proposed scheme regarding computation time 
and cipher-text message size [156].  
4.2.1 Correctness 
The correctness of the retrieved message is derived as follows: 
• Correctness of Keys: 
𝐾′ = 𝐻2( ê (sQd2, C1)) 
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        =  𝐻2( ê (sQd2, ri𝑃1)) 
         =  𝐻2( ê (riQd2, 𝑠𝑃1)) 
           =  𝐻2( ê (riQd2, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏)) 
                                                          = K 
• Correctness of Equation 3.1: 
                ê(𝐶𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛, 𝑃1) = ê (rih +  sQd1, 𝑃1)) 
            = ê (rih, 𝑃1) ê(sQd1, 𝑃1) 
             =  ê (h, ri𝑃1) ê(Qd1, 𝑠𝑃1) 
            = ê (h, C1) ê(Qd1, 𝑃𝑝𝑢𝑏) 
• Correctness of Unsigncryption: 
                                                    𝑚′ = 𝐶𝑒𝑛𝑐 ,  ⊕ 𝐾
′ 
   =  𝑚 ⊕  𝐾′⊕𝐾 
                                                          = m 
4.2.2 Results 
For evaluation purposes, the scheme is assessed according to the computation time that is 
taken by both the signcryption and unsigncryption processes. Although at the time, we 
could not identify any signcryption scheme that is designed mainly for providing 
authentication in smart home environments, we evaluated the presented scheme by 
comparing it with two other IBS schemes [157][158] that are implemented according to 
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the authors’ descriptions. Table 4.6 provides a comparison of our scheme with these two 
schemes regarding the computational overhead and cipher-text length. As the comparison 
shows, our scheme outperforms the other two schemes regarding computational costs and 
cipher-text size. 
For this evaluation, we consider the implementation of Tate Pairing on an MNT curve with 
an embedding degree of k = 6 where G1 is represented by 161 bits, and order p represented 
by 160 bits on a machine with Intel Pentium IV 3.0 GHz. Since pairing and point 
multiplication computations are the main computations in the proposed scheme, they have 
been considered in calculating the execution time in comparison with the related work. We 
adopt the measured processing time [159][160] as follows: 𝑇ê = 4.5 (𝑚𝑠) is the time of a 
pairing operation whereas 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 = 0.6 (𝑚𝑠) is the time of a one point multiplication 
operation in G1. As shown in Table 4.6, in the proposed scheme in this thesis, there are 
three multiplication operations and five pairing operations for the whole scheme. 
Table 4.6. Computational overhead and cipher-text length 
Scheme 
 
Performed Operations Cipher-text Length 
𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙 ê 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 (𝑚𝑠) 
The Proposed Scheme 3 5 24.3 |m| + 2| G1| 
[157] 5 5 25.5 |m| + 2| G1| 
[158] 4 5 24.9 |m| + 2| G1| + |𝑍𝑝
∗  | 
 
In the signcryption stage, there are three multiplication operations and one pairing 
operation and in the unsigncryption stage there are four pairing operations. Thus, 
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signcryption and unsigncryption of the proposed scheme are calculated according to the 
following formula: 
𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  (𝑚𝑠) = (number of the pairing operations) x  𝑇ê  + (number of the multiplication 
operations) x 𝑇𝑚𝑢𝑙                                                                                             (4.1) 
Thus, the execution time of the whole scheme would be: 𝑇𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  (𝑚𝑠) = 5 𝑥 𝑇ê +
3 𝑥 𝑇mul = 5 𝑥 4.5 + 3 𝑥 0.6 = 24.3 𝑚𝑠 
4.3 Evaluation of App-Based User Authentication Model 
As a first step to considering the app usage patterns of end-user devices (e.g., smartphones 
or tablets) for user access authentication in smart homes in IoT networks, the primary 
objective of this work is to investigate the following research questions: 
• Can users be authenticated based on the time usage patterns of apps? If there is a 
change, how much time (e.g., days or weeks) is needed to build a model to 
authenticate users? This question investigates the change in app usage patterns over a 
long period (e.g., months), and its effect on accuracy, as well as determines the time 
needed to build a model to authenticate users with a minimum threshold regarding 
training data. 
• Do the overall app usage patterns change over time (e.g., a week or a month)? If so, 
does any change affect accuracy?  
Additionally, several studies have examined mobile app usage in the broader population 
but failed to consider network traffic patterns during app access for user authentication. 
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Thus, another step is to investigate the following research questions related to using app 
access patterns and network traffic patterns on Wi-Fi or cellular to authenticate users:  
• Can users be authenticated based on time usage patterns and generated network traffic 
patterns while accessing apps? This question investigates whether the total access 
time and the traffic generated while accessing apps can be utilized to accurately 
authenticate end-users.  
• Do the overall app usage patterns and network traffic patterns change over time (e.g., 
a week or a month)?  
• Does either a Wi-Fi or a cellular access pattern more accurately authenticate users?   
4.3.1 Evaluation Metrics 
Many evaluation metrics can be utilized, such as true positive (TP); false positive (FP); true 
negative (TN); and false negative (FN).  
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑇𝑃𝑅) =
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑁
                              (4.2) 
𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝑇𝑁𝑅) =
𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑃
                            (4.3) 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐹𝑃𝑅) =
𝐹𝑃
𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
                               (4.4) 
𝐹𝑎𝑙𝑠 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 (𝐹𝑁𝑅) =
𝐹𝑁
𝐹𝑁 + 𝑇𝑃
                              (4.5) 
The classification accuracy and error rates of the utilized algorithm can then be raised in the 




Table 4.7. A Two-class confusion matrix 
 Predicted positive Predicted negative 
Actual positive True positive (TP) False positive (FP) 
Actual negative False negative (FN) True negative (TN) 
 
The classification accuracy and the error rate can be calculated as follows: 
𝐶𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =
𝑇𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁
𝑇𝑃 + 𝐹𝑃 + 𝑇𝑁 + 𝐹𝑁
                     (4.6) 
𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  1 – (𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦)                            (4.7) 
In contrast, most classifiers are more sensitive in detecting majority classes than the minority 
examples, which are the most important in our case, and in this case the classifier may be 
biased. The classification accuracy metric may not reflect the real performance of the 
proposed model; hence the literature recommends other advanced metrics, such as recall 
and precision, to evaluate the accuracy of the classification algorithms [161][162]. In this 
thesis, the classification performance of the positive class is more significant, thus the two 
measures. The TPR, also called recall (R), references the percentage of retrieved objects 
that are relevant to the targeted class. The other classification performance metric which is 
known as precision (P), references the percentage of relevant objects which are identified 
for retrieval. These two measures, R and P, are then used in calculating the F-measure to 
give a single accuracy measurement of a class, ensuring that both measures the R and the P 




                                                                       (4.8) 
Precision (P)=  
𝑇𝑃
𝑇𝑃+𝐹𝑃 




2 ∗ 𝑃 ∗ 𝑅
𝑃 + 𝑅
                                                           (4.10) 
In the presented model, we need to reduce the FPR as much possible in order to improve 
security. Consequently, we consider FPR as a high priority in our model. The FNR, which 
also has an impact on the performance of the model, is important as it will impact the 
usability of the model.  As a consequence, it is taken into consideration in the proposed 
model. In order to reduce the cost of misclassification, we need the model to reduce the 
FPR, making it close to 0, thus increasing the precision and maximizing the R. In other 
words, we can afford the expense of classifying positive classes as negative, an action which 
has less impact than classifying negative classes as positive. Thus, our main objective is to 
decrease the FPR as far as possible, followed by eliminating the FNR. The one-vs-all  [147] 
is utilized, in which one class is trained with all N other classes with an average accuracy 
(𝐴𝑣𝑒) as exhibited in Equation (4.11). As an example of this approach, if there are five 
different classes (𝑎5) of data, one class will be trained against the other four.  





1   (where i =  1,2,  … ,  n)               (4.11) 
4.3.2 Datasets 
For the evaluation procedure, three datasets are utilized. The first one, the Android App-
Usage dataset [163], is extracted from users’ access profiles while using Android apps on 
end-user devices. This dataset contains two categories, the first of which is management 
activity data, including app installation, uninstallation and updates. The second category is 
the network trace data, which collects any network activity, such as whether the access is 
made via cellular or Wi-Fi networks, and provides the daily total access time and traffic 
generated from foregrounds and backgrounds. This information is calculated according to 
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the flows at the TCP level and is counted separately for cellular and Wi-Fi networks. 
Distinguishing between the background and foreground is accomplished by examining the 
Android system stack every two seconds. The app is considered as running in the 
foreground if it was active in the last two seconds. The features used in the evaluation 
include the user's identifier, the date of this data entry, time, the time of app access, the app 
identifier, foreground (Cellular and Wi-Fi network connection) time, and foreground 
(Cellular and Wi-Fi) generated traffic. The second dataset is the UbiqLog4UCI [164] that 
is collected from 35 users in a period of approximately three months. As not all users have 
app access information that is adequate for analysis, the information from only 30 users is 
utilized in the evaluation. The third dataset is the LiveLab [165] project dataset collected 
from 35 users in a period of approximately one year. The collected information includes 
categories such as a list of all installed apps among all users, apps run by users, phone calls 
made/received by users, accelerometer readings, and time that the logger was running. 
However, the utilized information in this evaluation is related to apps usage and the 
registered time when apps were accessed.   
4.3.3 App Access Time Patterns and Network Traffic Patterns 
This subsection provides evaluation results of the classification model that uses usage 
patterns and network traffic patterns for the purpose of authenticating users. The 
authentication model works by classifying each single event, namely the usage patterns and 
the generated traffic of the accessed apps, received from the user’s device and identifies the 
users [148]. The model selects continuously accessed apps shared among users and predicts 
and classifies potentially unauthorized actions in the user’s access behavior. The focus in 
this thesis is on classifying multi-users rather than one user. To select the most suitable 
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classifier as well as ensuring that the model is not classifier specific, we applied various 
classification strategies, including Random Forest (RF) [166], Decision Tree (DT) [167], 
K-Neighbors Classifier (KNN) [168], Gaussian Process Classifier (GPC) [169], 
GaussianNB (NB) [170], Multi-layer Perception Classifier (MLP) [171], Quadratic 
Discriminant Analysis (QDA) [168], Support Vector Machine (SVM) [172], Nearest 
Centroid (NC) [173], Ridge Classifier (RC) [174], and BernoulliNB (BNB) [175]. These 
algorithms are applied to each part of the dataset, time access events and network traffic 
events. We divided the dataset into 70% for training the model and 30% for validating the 
model [176][177]. As a first step, we compared common classification approaches on the 
training set in terms of recall, precision and F-measure. Then, the algorithm that provides 
the highest recall, precision and high F-measure is implemented, which is the RF classifier.  
Despite some apps in the utilized dataset with minor usage time, with access time close to 
zero, being tested for the purpose of identifying users, we found the effect on accuracy was 
minor, and such apps were removed from the datasets. Additionally, the dataset is cleaned 
from unnecessary rows when both Wi-Fi network traffic data and foreground cellular 
network traffic were equal to zero. From the visualization of the dataset, there is a variance 
of users’ daily access time during weekdays. Thus, extracting the days of the week and 
converting them to a numerical representation is an important step for the classifier. 
However, mapping weekdays into numbers may lead the algorithm to give more importance 
to larger numbers than others because of their higher numerical values. Thus, to avoid the 
problem, these numbers are converted into seven binary columns.  
For the purpose of user authentication, our goal is to use apps that are most employed by 
users. However, the main target here is to test our model on differentiating between users 
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who utilize same apps in approximately at the same daily intervals. Therefore, we removed 
the less frequently used apps and selected the most used apps used by all users during the 
20 weeks. To avoid the classifier being biased to the majority samples, an up-sampling 
mechanism is applied to both parts of the dataset, access time and network traffic events. 
Furthermore, the oversampling is achieved after dividing the dataset and applied only on 
the training data. This step avoids the validation and training sets from having the same 
samples, thus eliminating overfitting.  
The next stage is to examine the difference between including all the accessed apps and the 
most accessed apps selected during the preprocessing stage, as well as to guarantee that 
these apps come from the same distribution by users in the dataset, student t-test (t) statistical 
significance with the degree of freedom (df) [178] is used, based on the formulas 4.12 to 



































                                                                    (4.15) 
Where 𝑧1̅and 𝑧2̅ are the sample means, 𝑞
2 is the sample variance, 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 are the sample 
sizes with a degree of freedom 𝑑𝑓, using Satterthwaite's approximation. The standard 
deviation resulted from including all apps is 2.75, and 2.9 from including the most used 
apps. The calculated t value is 0.83, which is less than 2.06, with a degree of freedom of 25 
at p=0.05. Consequently, there is no significant difference between both data samples, all 




Figure 4.4. F-measure performance of both access time and network traffic patterns 
 
Figure 4.5. FPR and FNR performance of both access time and network traffic patterns 
 
The performance of the proposed method is then examined with regard to the false positive 
rate (FPR) and false negative rate (FNR) and F-measure. The results obtained are based on 










































this timeframe, a period of 152 days, 530 different apps were accessed at least once by one 
user, generating 66,704 different events. In spite of the large number of users included in 
the dataset collection, only the data of 10 users is publicly available. The next step is to test 
the model to authenticate users against unknown users. However, it is impossible to have 
unknown users’ data for training the model. Thus, in order to test the proposed model in 
differentiating users, the one-vs-all method is applied. The one-vs-all classification 
approach means that the target user will be labeled as normal whereas the rest of the users 
are labeled as anomalies. The model is tested to authenticate users in an incremental way in 
terms of the number of weeks for a period of 20 consecutive weeks, as shown in Figure 4.4. 
Training the model is achieved data of the prior week(s) and then the model is tested on 
unseen data of the following week. The performance of the model continues to be high with 
a minimum F-measure of 98%. The model is then tested on the dataset with regard to the 
FPR and FNR for the same period. The average FPR and FNR utilizing the one-vs-all 
classification approach is presented in Figure. 4.5. As seen in Figure. 4.5, the model achieves 
a maximum FPR of 1.3%, which is considered low, when combining both the access time 
patterns and the network traffic patterns. 
The results demonstrate that users can be authenticated based on their total app usage time 
and generated network traffic, which addresses the research questions set at the beginning. 
As the most used apps on smartphones are heavily reliant on networks, the primary focus of 
this test is on user authentication based on the daily app usage and network traffic generated 
while accessing these apps. The results indicate that users can be authenticated with a 
minimum F-measure of 98%. In this test, the most frequently used apps are utilized, which 
reflect the actual patterns of users while accessing the apps, as well as combine both the 
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total app usage time and generated network traffic. Additionally, the chosen apps are either 
network-based or the type that rely on networks to function. Furthermore, this test considers 
only the usage patterns and the network traffic of foreground online-based accessed apps 
which demonstrates user interaction patterns with these apps, thus reflecting patterns of 
interaction. Since the utilized apps are continuously accessed, traffic from such apps is 
continually generated.  
From the dataset analysis, most of the traffic is produced via Wi-Fi networks, which are the 
most utilized user networks. In addition, Wi-Fi traffic patterns provide more authentication 
accuracy than Cellular networks. However, the accuracy level is improved when combining 
both Wi-Fi and Cellular network traffic data. Based on the results, there is a minimal change 
in the usage patterns of users when utilizing the generated traffic data of the most foreground 
accessed apps by users. Additionally, Wi-Fi network traffic patterns provide more 
authentication accuracy than cellular networks. However, the accuracy level is improved 
when combining both Wi-Fi and cellular network traffic data, as shown in results. Although 
there are some changes in the app access time and in the total traffic during app access time, 
these changes do not significantly affect the accuracy level as a result of using the most 
frequently used apps. Moreover, by combining both access time and network traffic 
patterns, the accuracy level is improved, as shown in Figure 4.5, where the average of FPR 
and FNR do not change much from week 1 to week 20. 
4.3.4 App Access Events-Based User Authentication 
This subsection provides evaluation results of the app-based user authentication model that 
uses apps access event patterns to authenticate users. To evaluate the performance of the 
app-based user authentication model, the two datasets UbiqLog4UCI and LiveLab are 
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utilized, and the authentication performance is considered as the accuracy metric when 
classifying an access event to one of the enrolled users. The collection procedure for both 
datasets includes the foreground accessed apps with the timestamp for the time being 
accessed. Thus, the collected logs are represented in the form of tuples: app_id, u_id, 
app_st, and app_ed. The time is represented in the form of a Unix timestamp. To make 
sure that the presented model is not classification algorithm specific, three classification 
algorithms are used in training. The selected classifiers in this research, which are mostly 
used in the literature, such as in [179][180][181], including three different classification 
methodologies. The first classifier is the RF classifier, which fits a number of decision tree 
classifiers on various subsamples of instances and utilizes the average in order to improve 
accuracy and eliminate over-fitting. The second classifier is the gradient boosting classifier 
that offers several hyperparameter tuning options that provide the function with a very 
flexible fit. The third classifier is the KNN which applies the k-nearest neighbors’ vote. 
Although it is easy to implement, the training data has to be saved at the classification time.  
• Statistical Analysis of the Extracted Features 
The imbalance in the class representations is important to consider during the training and 
testing process of the model. From the analysis, the imbalance in the classes is clear in both 
datasets. Consequently, considering the variance in the classes’ representation is necessary. 
After the mentioned features at the feature extraction subsection are extracted, user usage 
patterns can be learned, and a template of this pattern can be built and then utilized for the 
authentication process. Selecting the most effective features is an important process 
because it will strengthen the pattern template of users and subsequently affect the 
performance of the classification process. Before evaluating the proposed approach for user 
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authentication, we study the feasibility of utilizing the extracted features for differentiating 
users.  
Hence, in order to test similarities between user patterns and to examine the effect of the 
extracted features on discriminating between users, a comparison regarding the standard 
deviation (std) and the mean is considered, as shown in Table 4.8 for the UbiqLog4UCI 
dataset and in Table 4.9 for the LiveLab dataset. The extracted features, in addition to the 
day of the year and week_day, are app_sq, app_cont_sq, app_cat, app_dur, inter_pi and 
intra_pi. For the analysis, we selected the most similar users from both datasets, according 
to similarity of access patterns. For the UbiqLog4UCI dataset, within the same features, 
the app_dur, we can see from Table 4.8 that the mean for users (1 and 2), (3 and 20) and 
(18 and 19) is similar. However, the std is different for (1 and 2) but still similar for users 
(3 and 20) and (18 and 19).  





User mean std mean std mean std mean std 
1 17.94 10.02 9.13 5.66 2.05 1.19 90.00 30.78 
2 18.91 90.00 10.00 10.00 25.61 31.14 29.22 69.25 
3 42.90 10.70 11.59 11.07 15.41 16.40 10.06 10.14 
6 52.28 10.85 12.77 15.11 13.01 16.08 10.36 10.29 
18 26.22 10.64 28.38 43.78 7.52 10.61 10.22 10.33 
19 26.72 10.41 47.97 59.14 38.06 29.40 11.13 19.21 
20 42.67 10.60 37.49 50.55 21.68 24.02 36.55 54.57 
22 14.70 10.01 34.75 52.81 10.22 10.38 10.73 10.48 
27 23.29 10.36 55.40 90.00 23.94 24.29 11.54 14.87 
28 60.03 10.89 57.96 55.03 51.38 48.76 11.08 14.12 
30 24.65 11.12 35.76 67.07 13.77 13.93 46.24 90.00 
 
There is a close similarity between the mean of the app_cont_sq feature for users (22 and 
30) and (27 and 28) while the std is different for the same users. In addition, in the feature 
96 
 
intra_pi, there is a close similarity between users (3, 6, 18 and 22) and (27 and 28) in both 
the mean and the std, which makes it difficult to differentiate between these users using 
these features. However, the similarities become less for other users and, in turn, will 
enhance the performance of the classification. For the LiveLab dataset, within the same 
features, the app_dur of apps, we can see from Table 4.9 that the mean is similar for users 
(5 and 12) but the std between these users is different, while it is similar for users (6 and 
31).  





User mean std mean std mean std mean std 
2 58.91 88.88 48.92 45.60 13.89 17.37 26.75 57.38 
3 26.35 40.93 45.15 43.77 18.20 22.25 15.76 36.32 
5 32.93 51.32 37.61 49.28 13.03 16.05 17.75 42.61 
6 50.03 66.64 55.64 63.42 14.19 20.25 13.19 11.53 
12 35.76 72.17 73.84 87.49 28.23 43.38 23.46 53.68 
14 18.90 18.00 77.46 73.50 5.29 5.60 90.00 90.00 
21 55.50 67.15 12.11 10.00 17.23 25.22 20.41 48.09 
31 40.51 66.08 33.36 26.48 17.67 24.77 14.97 25.07 
32 71.16 82.69 29.73 27.69 9.59 12.16 24.07 34.42 
33 43.37 49.30 29.59 21.94 27.52 37.49 11.32 21.39 
 
There is a close similarity between the mean of the app_cont_sq feature for users (32 and 
33) but the std is different for these users. However, there is a similarity for the std between 
users (31 and 32). In addition, in the feature app_sq, there is a close similarity between users 
(2, 5, and 6) and (21 and 31) in the mean, and similarity between users (2 and 5) and (21 and 
31) for the std. There is a close similarity between the mean of the intra_pi feature for users 
(3 and 31) but the std is different for these users. However, the similarities become less for 




For the evaluation, many evaluation metrics can be utilized to evaluate the presented 
approach in this thesis. However, our main focus is to decrease the FPRs and FNRs as far as 
possible. After building the normal user behavior model, the second step is to test the model 
to also authenticate users against anomalies, i.e., unknown users. However, it is impossible 
to have unknown users’ data for training the model. Thus, in order to test the proposed 
model in differentiating users, the one-vs-all method is applied. The one-vs-all 
classification approach means that the target user will be labeled as normal whereas the 
rest of the users are labeled as anomalies.  As seen from Figures 4.6 and 4.7, the number 
of interactions with apps changes during the weeks, which means that the users’ access 
patterns are not consistent over a long time period. Although the LiveLab dataset has a 
period of one year, we selected 12 weeks from both datasets, for reasons of consistency.  
Another important feature that we considered during feature extraction is intra_pi. Figures 
4.8 and 4.9 show the average intrer_pi between apps for a 12 week period for five selected 
users from both datasets. As seen from these figures, in addition to the difference in the 
average access time to apps, it is noticeable that not all users have continuous access to apps 
during the full time period. This might affect the classification procedure and increase the 
FPRs and FNRs. To solve this issue, we utilized a new feature, the app_cont_sq, for each 
app. Therefore, for either a new user or a previously known user, the new added apps will 
not be included by the model until a specific access sequence threshold is reached, namely 
the value of app_cont_sq. In addition, testing the model against unknown users’ data will 




Figure 4.6. Number of interactions with apps per week for 12 weeks 
 

































































Figure 4.8. The average intrer_pi for selected users for the UbiqLog4UCI dataset 
 





















































Figure 4.10. Model performance based on the number of interactions with apps for the 
UbiqLog4UCI dataset 
 















































Figure 4.12. Model performance on unseen data for the UbiqLog4UCI dataset 
 































































































































As seen from Figures 4.10 and 4.11, the FPRs, FNRs and EERs are improved as the number 
of app_cont_sq of apps increases. Therefore, to reduce the FPRs, FNRs and EERs, the 
presented approach in this thesis requires a minimum number of app_cont_sq for each app 
to be considered in the access decision, in addition to requiring a specific number of last 
events, in order to make the decisions at the time of the request. In other words, the app will 
be considered only when reaching a minimum number of app_cont_sq, and the access 
decision will be made based on the number of the last two events and their classification by 
the model. As the target is to discover any access anomalies in the network, the number of 
events required by the decision unit should be as small as possible. This will also reduce the 
processing time for user authentication. In order to find the best set of access sequence of 
events, the datasets were tested, the results of which are shown in Figures 4.10 and 4.11. 
Classifiers can then be trained on data from the owner and others, without assuming any 
known data from the attacker. Figures 4.12 and 4.13 show the evaluation results of this 
approach where the threshold is set to 50 or greater. From the results, it is clear that the 
model achieves good accuracy with a low FPR and FNR. Additionally, as seen from the 
results, users who have more access events provide a lower FPR and FNR. 
The next evaluation is based on the number of users involved.  The average EER is shown 
in Figures 16 and 17. It can be observed from the results that there is little change in the 
average EER when increasing the number of users. The maximum EER is 3.13% when 
considering the RF classifier. Moreover, as seen in Figures 4.14 and 4.15, the performance 
of the presented approach consistently remains below 3.13%. However, as the number of 
users increases, the performance slightly decreases. This decrease in performance is mainly 
a result of similarity in the users’ access sessions, as usage may change and similarity 
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among users may be present. The results indicate that the model produces a low EER even 
when the number of users increases. 
 
Figure 4.14. Model performance based on the number of enrolled users for the 
UbiqLog4UCI dataset 
 









































































































































Figure 4.16. Model performance based on simulated access requests for the 
UbiqLog4UCI dataset 











































Figure 4.17. Model performance based on simulated access requests for the LiveLab 
dataset 
 














































Table 4.10. Comparison with related work 




Performance (TPR, FPR and 
EER) (%) 
[25] Calls, SMS and GPS 
based location 
MIT (one month) EER=5.4, 35.1 and 35.7 
[60] Calls, SMS, Web 
browsing history. 
Collected by the authors 
and only include 
telephone calls, SMSs 
and Web browsing 
history. 





telephone calls, SMS 
and multi-instance 
(combined basic and 
extended apps). 
MIT (one month) EER=13.5, 5.4, 2.2 and 9.8 
[88] Unique app usage 
data 
UMDAA-02 Mean EER ≈ 30  
Securacy  Mean EER ≈ 16 
[89] 
 





Carried out by the 
authors for a period of at 
least one month. 
FAR= 30, FRR=18, EER=5 




Most used apps and 
location. 
MIT  EER =9.004  
UCCS carried out by the 





All foreground apps UbiqLog4UCI FPR=0.91, FNR=4.94, 
EER=2.92 
LiveLab FPR=1.03, FNR=4.84, 
EER=2.94 
 
For the last evaluation step, we simulate access requests on the unseen data, 30% of the 
dataset, and the proposed approach is tested based on Equation 3.2, while the results are 
shown in Figures 4.16 and 4.17. From these figures, we can see that the minimum 
percentage of average access decisions made is 95.20 % in the UbiqLog4UCI dataset for 
user 25 while the maximum percent of average access decisions made is 99.98 for user 1. 
The low 95.20 % for user 1 is because of the similarity with user 22. For the LiveLab 
dataset, we can see that the minimum percentage of average access decisions made is 91.53 
% in the LiveLab dataset for user 3 while the maximum percent of average access decisions 
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made is 99.62 for user 14. The low 91.53 % for user 1 is because of the similarity with 
users 5 and 6, as discussed in the statistical analysis of the generated features shown in 
Tables 4.6 and 4.7. This presented model can be compared and differentiated from other 
presented research studies in the literature as shown in Table 4.10. 
4.4 Security Analysis 
Security analysis of possible attacks on the framework are discussed here in order to 
validate the ability of the framework components to protect against them. In this 
subsection, we present security analysis of the implemented prototype, the proposed 
device-to-device message authentication scheme, and the presented app-based user 
authentication model. 
4.4.1 Context-Based Prototype 
There are possible scenarios that can take place after the user registration stage and before 
completing the usage pattern model. The first possible attack is obtaining a user’s login 
and password. In the event that a user’s login and password were stolen, compromised, or 
even loaned out, the other security contexts would still be able to react by denying the new 
user access from another device identification or scheduling. In addition, the user’s login 
and password are protected in transit to the TS through the use of HTTPS encryption and 
in the database, using a salted hash function. The second attack scenario is obtaining a 
user’s device. This type of attack could be mitigated by considering the device’s location 
through the IP address and proximity detection. If the device were stolen and not yet 
reported to the administrator, its absence from the home network or known remote 
locations would be sufficient to deny access to a malicious user. The other type of attack 
is brute force, and this type of attack is countered by monitoring and recording both login 
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attempts and service access attempts, locking out a user’s account or device until reviewed 
by the administrator. For unauthorized modification of external data such as the schedule, 
a cached copy of the calendar is kept on the TS. In addition, any update in the schedule 
will be flagged and reported to the administrator, and permission is required to update the 
cached copy on the TS. Moreover, the assigned weight values can be set by the 
administrator based on the availability of contextual information. For example, if a user 
does not have a calendar, the weights can be set based on other available contextual 
attributes. Furthermore, the time it would take to detect the availability of intrusion is the 
same as the re-check time. This time is determined based on the average of the previous 
access sessions of the user.  
The weighting of the various contexts also prevents any single data source being 
compromised from significantly affecting the security of the system as a whole, with the 
calendar scheduling not explicitly permitting any user access as a prime example. An IP 
address conflicts or is malformed, or any non-IEEE compliant MAC addresses be other 
indicators of possible spoofing attempts. Hence, the use of certificate-based authentication 
would prevent the possibility of the TS being impersonated by an attacker. For data 
protection, no information related to users is stored on the end-user devices as they are 
susceptible to loss or theft. This ensures that if the device is compromised, the adversary 
cannot learn the user profile and simulate the user’s behavior to gain system access. 
Furthermore, all data is verified and replicated to a backup location to avoid both data loss 
and the need to retrain user profiles, thus preventing a malicious user from rebuilding a 




4.4.2 Device-to-Device Message Authentication Scheme 
The analysis focuses on how the proposed scheme can realize security requirements for 
smart home IoT device communications. Three main security requirements are considered 
in the proposed scheme. The first security factor is the authentication. Only the messages 
signcrypted by a legitimate sender device with 𝐼𝐷𝑑1 could be unsigncrypted by the intended 
receiver with the corresponding 𝐼𝐷𝑑2. Furthermore, only the TS can compute the correct 
private key of the communicated devices. Thus, the proposed scheme can guarantee the 
message authentication between the end-user device and the home device as well as with 
the TS since this server is the only one that generates the public parameters and issues the 
private keys of the involved devices. Additionally, any messages cannot be signed by an 
adversary without having the sender’s secret key 𝑆𝑑1. The second security factor is the 
integrity. Based on the complexity assumptions outlined in (Chapter 3) subsection 3.4, 
which are provably secure in the random oracle model [144], any intercepted message by 
an attacker cannot be encrypted without reaching the randomly chosen number 𝑟𝑖  𝑍𝑝
∗  
which is used for each message to be sent. A different random number is included in each 
new message and in the case of knowing this number, the future sent message will not use 
the same number, hence will resist against reply attack. As a result, the proposed scheme 
can protect against active attacks to target data integrity, such as modifying or altering a 
command during its transmission, thus protecting the integrity of transmitted messages. 
Confidentiality is the third security goal. As the private key is generated and issued by the 
TS, which is trusted, and these keys are transferred offline over a secure channel, an attacker 
cannot access a private key of the connected devices. Thus, since an attacker cannot decrypt 
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the transmitted message without knowing the receiver’s private key, message 
confidentiality is ensured. 
4.4.3 App-Based User Authentication Model 
The presented app-based user authentication model is based on user access patterns with 
apps on mobile devices. However, user behavior in accessing apps (in terms of access time 
and continuity accessing the same apps) might change over time, as seen from the results. 
In other words, user access patterns may change over time and these changes, such as 
adding new apps or stopping the use of others, should be considered. However, we 
overcome this issue by extracting new multi-instance features, including app_cont_sq, 
app_sq, inter_pi, and intra_pi, as discussed in the subsection of statistical analysis of the 
extracted features. Thus, by including the app_cont_sq of newly launched apps, we 
guarantee that the apps will not be considered in the authentication process until having 
enough training data. Further, utilizing multi-events (last accessed app patterns) and the 
inter_pi in the access decision will increase security and reduce the chance of the access 
being sent from an illegitimate user. Additionally, as the authentication takes place, other 
registered users will be allowed access from registered devices, which increases the 
usability of the proposed method.  
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Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work 
 
This thesis presents a contextual authentication framework for smart home environments. 
This framework consists of three main parts: the context-based user authentication method, 
device-to-device message authentication, and app-based user authentication model. The 
first part is a context-based authentication method that utilizes contextual information to 
verify the current user who is trying to access smart home IoT devices from his/her 
registered end-device (smartphone/tablet). The second part is a device-to-device message 
authentication scheme to protect transmitted messages among smart home IoT devices. The 
third part is a user authentication model that builds a user profile based on previous apps’ 
access history in order to make the right decision at the login stage, at subsequent access 
requests regarding authorized user access and during the access sessions.  
From the results obtained, each of the proposed user authentication mechanisms can operate 
individually and can be complementary to other approaches, according to the situation. In 
addition, the proposed architecture of the framework can be easily extended to include 
other authentication mechanisms. The security aspect of the proposed framework is 
analyzed, and its performance is evaluated in practical scenarios. Additionally, this 
framework can be adopted in other IoT applications, such as smart medical care, smart grid 
and smart environmental protection. Furthermore, the framework has the ability to protect 
home devices against unauthorized access from anonymous and known users, whether 
locally or remotely, by monitoring all communication to said devices by the TS. Moreover, 
the framework monitors all access-related activities, such as attempted logins, service 
requests, and access durations, storing them in a database for future analysis by establishing 
usage patterns and detecting brute force attempts and other anomalies.  
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Additionally, the proposed IBS scheme, as compared to other schemes, can achieve the 
security requirements for device-to-device communication in the smart home. Based on 
the security analysis and assumptions, the presented IBS scheme can efficiently achieve 
the security requirements for device-to-device communication in the smart home. 
Ultimately, the framework provides user authentication both at the point-of-entry and 
during the access session in addition to providing secure communication between the home 
IoT devices. In addition, the statistical analysis of the extracted features, show that the 
adoption of decision-making based on last app events leads to high accuracy and that 
considering the inter_pi and intra_pi features increases the level of security and reduces 
the chance of the network being accessed by unauthorized users. Hence, this approach will 
provide transparent user authentication as users interact with apps and services.  
The next subsections summarise the contributions of this thesis and the directions for future 
work. 
5.1 Conclusion 
This thesis provides a contextual authentication framework that considers context-based 
user authentication, device-to-device message authentication, and app-based user 
authentication. The contributions of this thesis are: 
1. A literature review and classification of authentication mechanisms that can be adopted 
or presented for smart homes. In addition to providing a discussion of the limitations 
of the existing approaches with regard to security and usability, this review presents 
proposals for: smart home security frameworks; pattern-based authentication 
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approaches for mobile phone users; and public cryptographic mechanisms to secure 
communication between smart home IoT devices.  
2. The design, implementation and evaluation of a proof of concept prototype, 
examination of the available contextual information with regards to its permission 
requirements and retrieval time, and utilization of this contextual information for user 
authentication. The objective of the proposed framework is to increase security in 
addition to delivering usability and protecting user information. Moreover, information 
will not be saved on the user’s device, but on a TS by applying security protection for 
data storage as well as a backup server. Thus, in the case of losing the end-device, the 
user will not lose any information. 
3. The design and evaluation of an efficient and secure scheme for information exchange 
among smart home IoT devices. This scheme is efficient regarding cipher-text length 
and computational cost. During the authentication process, the proposed scheme does 
not require access to the TS; access to this server is only needed at the time of 
registration or for updating secret keys. In addition to providing authentication, the 
proposed scheme provides integrity and confidentiality as well as the ability to protect 
communication among devices against various possible attacks. Compared to other 
schemes, the proposed scheme can efficiently achieve the security requirements for 
device-to-device communication in the smart home.  
4. The design and evaluation of an app-based user authentication model to protect smart 
homes from unauthorized access in addition to protecting the access of users who have 
weak or no security protection on their end-devices. This model adapts to app usage 
changes, such as using new apps or stopping the use of others. This model is able to 
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authenticate registered users utilizing app interactions, as well as generated network 
traffic on mobile devices, with considerably high accuracy. The proposed model does 
not require specific action from the user in order to be authenticated; rather, it is based 
on regular actions while accessing apps, which enhances usability to users. The 
presented authentication method is performed in the background, based on the user’s 
general access routine. In order to improve the usability and efficiency of the proposed 
approach, only minimal features are utilized.  
In conclusion, the proposed architecture of the framework can be easily extended to include 
other authentication mechanisms. It can also be concluded that the security measures do 
not impose significant connection overhead, which amounts to the system acting almost 
entirely transparently.  The security aspect of the proposed framework is analyzed, and its 
performance is evaluated in practical scenarios. Furthermore, this framework can be 
adopted in other IoT applications, such as smart medical care, smart agriculture, smart grid, 
and smart environmental protection. Ultimately, the framework provides user 
authentication both at the point-of-entry and during the access session in addition to 
providing secure communication between the home IoT devices.  
5.2 Future Work 
The limitations of the proposed framework are: 
1. Historical data retrieved from end-user devices and home environments, including 
sensor measurements such as temperature and other data measures that can enhance the 
proposed behavior-based model, are not considered. 
2. The proposed app-based authentication model is based on frequent access patterns for 
foreground apps and is limited to discovering foreground app access patterns. 
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Background apps are not considered since they have inconsistent access patterns. In 
addition, the modeling of background apps needs more data and the currently utilized 
datasets have limited background events which, in turn, are difficult to model. Since 
the proposed model cannot detect rare behavior patterns such as using an app only once 
(or limited time), it will instead request a second-factor authentication from the user, 
which may affect the usability.  
3. In the presented identity-based signcryption (IBS) scheme, the trusted server (TS) is 
assumed to be trusted. However, considering that IBE systems avoid using certificates 
and simplify certificate management, the key escrow problem can be considered as a 
limitation in cases where the TS is attacked.  
To address the limitations, future work includes:  
1. Measuring the quality of the retrieved information can explore the possibility of further 
analysis of the historical data (long-term contextual information) retrieved from end-
user devices and home environments, and include other data measures such as sensors, 
in order to generate higher fidelity user profiles using machine learning and other 
techniques.  
2. Investigation modeling of the usage access pattern to background apps can enhance the 
user authentication model. In addition, examining rare behavior patterns, such as using 
limited accessed interaction to specific apps, may improve the usability of the proposed 
model. 
3. For the presented IBS scheme, an investigation into the ability to apply the certificate-
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